|AVT-305 ||NATO UNCLASSIFIED||Active||RSM||2017||2018||Sensing Systems for Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) of Military Vehicles ||1|
Aircraft Health Management, Diagnostic, IVHM, Prognostics, Sensors, SHM, Structural Health Monitoring
Concepts of health and usage monitoring have been introduced to lower maintenance cost and to increase availability of military systems. As civil systems, military systems can greatly benefit from sensors and prognostics algorithms to reduce maintenance costs; however, military systems are used in a different ways and often in extreme environments. As a result, requirements for military sensor systems differ from that of civil systems, as they should be able to survive extreme conditions while sensing and predicting the remaining component life. Therefore, long-term reliability and accuracy of acquired data under service loading conditions as well as economic issues related to the implementation of sensing technologies in new and legacy military platforms needs further attention.
The objective of this AVT-305 Specialist Meeting is to offer an opportunity for both sensor developers and military vehicle operators to discuss the current status and implementation of sensing technologies for military vehicle health management. The goal is to improve the readiness level of such technologies for integration within the new and legacy military platforms to improve mission availability and safety while reducing operational and maintenance costs.
• Advanced sensing technologies for aircraft Structural Health Monitoring (SHM)
• Advanced sensing technologies for gas turbine engines
• Advanced sensing technologies for aircraft systems (landing gears etc.)
• Wireless sensors
• Energy harvesting / self-powered sensors
• Smart / embedded sensors
• Long-term durability and reliability of sensors due to load and environmental effects
• Implementation of sensors in new vehicles and platforms
• Implementation of sensors in legacy vehicles and platforms
• Sensor data acquisition, storage, and processing
|AVT-305||Applied Vehicle Technology|
|AVT-296||NATO UNCLASSIFIED||Active||RTG||2018||2020||Rotorcraft Flight Simulation Model Fidelity Improvement and Assessment ||1|
fidelity metrics, flight dynamics, flight simulation, flight simulation model update, inverse simulation, rotorcraft, system identification
Rotorcraft flight dynamics simulation models require high levels of fidelity to be suitable as prime items in support of life cycle practises; particularly vehicle and control design/development, and system and trainer certification. More rigorous and systematic practises for fidelity assessment and enhancement could pay huge dividends in reducing life cycle costs for both military and civil rotorcraft. The proposed technical activity will develop advanced and standardized simulation model fidelity metrics and compare a range of methods to improve the flight simulation model’s fidelity using case studies based on current flight test results. Militaries will be able to use the methods and metrics presented to set criteria that will underpin the use of modelling and simulation in certification to accelerate development and acquisition and reduce costs of new aircraft systems as well as legacy system upgrades. The criteria may also set standards for training devices to support the expansion of synthetic environments for training to offset the cost high costs of flying hours.
The research activity will develop and document various methods for updating flight dynamics math models with flight data. Different update methods may best suited for different end applications. The activity will also investigate different model fidelity metrics as suitable for the final intent of the model.
Rotorcraft flight dynamics modeling methods; flight simulation model update using flight data; model fidelity assessment metrics.
|AVT-296||Applied Vehicle Technology|
|AVT-275||NATO UNCLASSIFIED||Active||RTG||2017||2019||Continuous Airworthiness of Aging Systems |
Aircraft Airframe, engine, systems
A workshop, AVT-222, was held in October 2015 at which time various NATO nations made presentations on how they were ensuring the safety of aging aircraft (airframe and systems). The results from the workshop highlighted the aging aircraft issues, which the nations are experiencing, that are seriously impacting aircraft airworthiness and availability. Ageing mechanisms covered during the Workshop included: fatigue, corrosion, coating degradation, maintenance induced damage and polymeric degradation (time-dependent stress relaxation/deformation) as applied to airframe structures and back-up structure (for both fixed and rotary wing aircraft), mechanical subsystems, electrical/wiring connections, polymeric seals, environmental control systems, flight control systems, and corrosion protection systems. At the conclusion of the workshop, it was agreed that a focus on common maintenance airworthiness issues would help in strengthening the Maintenance Organizations’ ability to meet airworthiness requirements. To accomplish this it was proposed to develop a team approach to attack common aging problems based on: (a) Consequence/Risk-based ranking of aging issues; (b) Identifying required data; (c) Improving policy and guidance for addressing non-airframe subsystems and non-fatigue aging issues (corrosion, wear, mechanical damage, etc.) and d) Harmonizing proven “best practices” within systems as well as between systems were applicable.
To develop a document containing the best practices that have been developed in each NATO nation.
• Airframe Structures: corrosion, fatigue, new material systems, aging aircraft laboratories
• General Aircraft Systems: fuel, hydraulic & actuation, environmental control, electrical power generation, secondary power
• Mechanical Sub-systems: landing gear, helicopter drive train components, polymer degradation,
• Engine Sub-systems: corrosion, fatigue
• System Interfaces: landing gear – airframe, engine – airframe, main actuation system –airframe, etc..
• Influence of Cutting Processes on Service Life: cutting processes to include laser, plasma, and water-jet
• Influence of Paint Removal Processes on Service Life: paint removal processes such as laser and plasma, baseline to plastic media blasting (or some other common paint removal process)
|AVT-275||Applied Vehicle Technology|
|AVT-290||NATO UNCLASSIFIED||Active||RTG||2018||2020||Standardization of Augmented Reality for Land Platforms in Combat Environments ||1|
Augmented Reality, Situational Awareness, Standardization
Situational awareness is a decisive aspect of survivability for combat vehicles and soldiers in the battlefield, and Augmented Reality (AR) technologies have the potential to take it to the next level. The introduction of optical, IR and acoustic sensors for monitoring the battlefield, and in particular the integration of Battlefield Management Systems (BMS), has significantly improved the situational awareness. However, the crew of a combat vehicle (e.g. commander, gunner and driver) have in time critical situations difficulties to fully exploit the information provided by these systems, since crew members have to concentrate on the scene where the action is taking place. AR is a technique for overcoming this deficiency by presenting this information, typically from the BMS, directly in the operator’s sight, typically in form of graphical symbols. Thus the crew member can pay full attention to what is going on in the vehicle’s vicinity, while staying updated on the tactical situation within the sightsA field of view.
October 2015 a Research Specialists’ Meeting on AR (RSM-040) was held in Prague, Czech Republic, under the auspices of AVT-256,
- to present current state-of-the-art in AR technologies
- to identify military applications driving their development
- to highlight remaining technological and HMI challenges
The RSM identified the operational requirements AR technologies are expected to meet and provided an overview of R&D activities taking place in this field. Due to the strong interdisciplinary character of AR, aspects as diverse as Navigation and Positioning, Visualization and Display Technologies, Simulation and Training, as well as Human Factors, were addressed in this RSM. The maturity level of the technologies presented ranged from 6 to 9. The technical evaluator’s feedback brought to light fields of work in which it could be advantageous for the defence R&D community to leverage work that has been done in the civil automotive sector.
The RSM revealed research and technology strands that will contribute most to closing potential capability gaps, allowing the NATO nations to define common research goals and to coordinate future research activities in the field of AR. It also became evident that there is a need for harmonizing the various countries’ approaches within AR sub-areas like symbology, information management and user interface in general. A need to assure coherence with the development of AR capability for mounted and dismounted soldiers was also identified.
The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) addresses technologies providing enhanced situational awareness as one of the technology strands that are expected to deliver the desired capabilities of future combat vehicles. The AR technologies presented at the RSM are key to providing these desired capabilities. The RSM was the first step to consolidate the NATO-wide knowledge in the field of AR, to identify priorities for further research in this area and to pursue the development of the most promising AR technologies and applications. The logical next step is to agree on common research goals and to harmonise approaches amongst the countries pursuing AR technologies.
This RTG will support the Science & Technology Priorities Targets of Emphasis on AHP&H-4 “Human/Machine Interfaces”, IA&DS-3 “Multi-Domain Situational Awareness”, DC&P-4 “Advanced Signal Processing” and P&M-1 “Fast and Agile Platforms”.
The RSM-040 facilitated sharing of findings and results from AR related research amongst the participating nations. Although the RSM identified AR technologies that may contribute to closing existing and future capability gaps, it also revealed that the nations divert significantly in the perception of and approaches to AR. Thus several nations voiced their aspiration to harmonise their approaches and to coordinate future R&D activities in the field of AR in a follow-on activity under the STO umbrella.
Consequently it was agreed to propose an Exploratory Team (ET) for preparing a follow-on activity on AR standardisation. AVT-ET-169 was approved by the AVT Panel at the April 2016 meeting. An ET meeting was held in spring 2016, and the ET
- identified in which fields of AR a harmonisation of perceptions and approaches is most urgently needed
- agreed that a follow-on activity in the form of a Research Task Group (RTG) serves the purpose best
- defined the scope of work, timeline and expected outcome of the follow-on activity
- initiated the promotion of the follow-on activity in order to ensure participation of nations pursuing or interested in AR technologies
The TAP for the follow-on activity in the form of an RTG was developed. In the TAP the following topics have been defined.
The purpose of the RTG is to explore the standards that must be in place to ensure a coherent implementation of AR technology into the combat environment. Focus will be on land platforms and their interaction with mounted and dismounted personnel.
- Definitions – Define AR, Situational Awareness (SA), AR for SA.
- Use Cases – Define use cases, develop user requirements, write scenarios.
- Benefits - Investigate operational benefits and possible drawbacks of implementing AR for SA
- Technical Specifications - Determine requirements for relevant AR applications (e.g. navigation accuracy, location accuracy, latency thresholds, update rates, information density)
- User Interfaces - Develop/adapt and test AR user interfaces (e.g. functionality, information requirements, presentation and customisation).
- Symbology - Develop and test AR symbology (e.g. type/shape, size, transparency, colour and symbol overlap)
- Architectures - Examine the relation between a possible AR STANAG and the NGVA STANAG
- Experimentation - Test solutions/proposals (e. g. by simulations) involving the user community
|AVT-290||Applied Vehicle Technology|
|AVT-297||NATO UNCLASSIFIED||Active||RTG||2018||2020||Development of a Framework for Validation of Computational Tools for Analysis of Air and Sea Vehicles ||1|
Air, Computational, Sea, Validation, Vehicles
One of the keys to enabling development of 21st century weapon systems to meet new threats on shorter design cycles within affordable budgets is more reliance on physics-based simulation using evolving high performance computing systems. Physics-based systems engineering facilitates risk analysis, analysis of alternatives and integrated lifecycle engineering. High fidelity physics-based simulation has the potential to reduce cost and development time when simulations can be confidently used to augment or replace some systems testing in the development process. Systems simulations need to be validated to ensure that the simulation accurately models the system. Validation requires a database of experiments that cover the physics of the system.
The objective of the proposed Task Group is to develop a process to identify cases needed for a validation database for design of military aerospace and sea vehicles.
The following activities will be undertaken: Establish consensus on terminology and definition of validation experiments, Suggest a decomposition of vehicles into their constituent components, and Identify a framework and evaluate the framework using multiple use cases identified from vehicle qualification requirements.
|AVT-297||Applied Vehicle Technology|
|AVT-294||NATO UNCLASSIFIED||Active||RTG||2018||2020||Towards Improved Computational Tools for Electric Propulsion||1|
Electric Propulsion, Modeling, Plasma Physics, Simulation, Space Environment, Spacecraft, Survivability, Threat Identification
Electric Propulsion (EP), particularly in the form of the Hall-Effect Thruster (HET), is now a key component in the national defense space architectures for many NATO nations. The widespread deployment of EP, both in this realm and in the commercial realm, comes with a number of problems characteristic to many space vehicles. This range of problems includes: performance characterization in a realistic space weather environment; simulation of the plasma-spacecraft interactions, notably transport, material response, damage and contamination; prediction of radiative and electromagnetic signatures for remote detection and real-time identification of anomalies and true operating conditions; accurate statistical prediction of the interaction of high-energy plasma and charged particles from natural and transient space environment with spacecraft components, sensors and electronics.
The need for first-principles simulation in this field is critically driven by fundamental deficiencies in the ground test environment and the extreme expense of relevant flight test. Nevertheless, detailed understanding and reproducibility of these physical interactions in a virtual, i.e. simulated environment, is a daunting technological and scientific problem. In particular, advances in numerical algorithms, computer technology, and data analysis and model reduction must be combined into a comprehensive approach. The members of this RTG have worked as a team over the last two years to identify a path forward towards tackling the most significant hurdles towards achieving this first-principles simulation capability.
The work of both the exploratory team (NATO-AVT-ET-152, Assessment of Capabilities for First-Principles Simulation of Spacecraft Electric Propulsion Systems and Plasma Spacecraft Environment) and research workshop (NATO-AVT-271-RWS, Research Directions for First-Principles Simulation of Spacecraft Electric Propulsion Systems and Plasma Spacecraft Environment) has identified a realistic path towards the development of engineering design tools for understanding plasma propulsion devices and their interactions with the space environment. If computationally practical and sufficiently predictive, such simulations can be used not only to extend the lifetime and usefulness of the orbital assets, but also to help identify the source of malfunctions, and potentially provide real-time or forensic evidence of hostile actions, as opposed to natural effects from the self-generated or ambient environment.
The ultimate need for the NATO community is a fast running simulation capability for the whole propulsion system, including its electrical connections, coupled to appropriate models for the impact of space weather or micrometeorite damage. The scientific challenge of this long-term goal is the need to accurately model the bulk transport of magnetized electrons in a partially ionized plasma environment at reasonable computational expense. Accompanying this is the engineering challenge of how to make such predictive models trustworthy yet computationally tractable for use in tightly integrated systems engineering processes and potentially even for real-time threat detection.
This leads to two objectives for this RTG – the need to leverage the research efforts of NATO member nations to study a.) the state-of-the-art for predictive cross-field electron transport models and b.) model reduction to make computationally tractable the critical behavior of complex simulations such as EP plasma simulation. The product of this RTG is not a particular software product or set of algorithms, although these will likely be developed during the course of the technical effort. Rather, this RTG seeks to coordinate and accelerate NATO progress towards the development of a whole family of numerical models, beginning with simplified electron transport models but extending all the way to coupled HET simulations including realistic spacecraft geometries and boundary condition physics. As a means to facilitate frequent communications, regular twice-yearly information exchanges will be conducted by the group, including coordination with a partner NATO research lecture series. The technical team will be operate for a period of 3 years.
1.) NUMERICAL SIMULATION / ADVANCED THEORY: Utilize advanced computational capability to perform high-fidelity DNS-type simulations for reduced-dimensional / simplified BC conditions. Use advanced theory to develop new theoretical models to avoid the need to model the smallest lengthscales of cross-field electron transport.
2.) HIGH FIDELITY SIMULATION: Push the limits of computational simulation and low-diffusion kinetic methods to push up the fidelity of both engineering and scientific code capability for HETs to move the community towards the development of high-fidelity engineering codes for eventual integration into spacecraft-thruster plume codes and a high-fidelity scientific code for generation numerical “truth” simulations.
3.) RBM and UQ: Research in further code sensitivity and model reduction techniques open the potential to embed computational tools deeper into the systems engineering process and eventually into the on-orbit decision making process to assess real-time impacts of space weather and other external phenomena.
|AVT-294||Applied Vehicle Technology|
|AVT-292||NATO UNCLASSIFIED||Active||RTG||2018||2020||Munition Health Management Technologies: Effects on Operational Capability, Interoperability, Life-Cycle Cost and Acquisition of missile stockpiles of NATO nations |
Data management, Embedded Sensors, Environmental Sensors, Health Management, Internet of Things (IoT) Technologies, Interoperability, Inventory Monitoring, Missiles and Torpedoes, Passive RFID Autonomic Wireless Networks, Performance Based Acquisition, Propulsion & Power Systems, Stockpile Pooling
New, emerging Integrated Munition Health Management (IMHM) technologies derived from civil application can have a strong positive effect on operational capability, interoperability, life-cycle cost and even acquisition of missiles within NATO. Besides having a positive effect on safety assessments during In-Service Surveillance, they provide a critical ability to NATO forces: estimating the Safe Remaining Life of missiles at any point in time after manufacturing and deployment accurately and quickly. This implies the following:
• Missile life consumption can be defined and measured non-destructively and individually by applying MHM technology. The information is delivered quickly.
• The user can compute depreciation of its stockpile based on actual consumption, reducing the yearly life-cycle cost by a large amount, particularly with complex, expensive missiles systems providing critical tactical or strategic capabilities.
• Missiles can be supplied through within “performance based acquisition” frameworks: the end user would procure the capability. This can be used to reduce spending, or, at neutral budget, to expand the stockpile and capability to a realistic maximum, compatible with the allocated budget.
• NATO nations can put part of their stockpile in common, assigning it to a joint pool. Within a scientific, commercial and political framework agreement, which is specific for each system, every single user would be able to access the entire common stockpile to balance a threat or conduct operations, multiplying the firepower of each nation.
The proposed CDT will demonstrate implementation options made possible through existing MHM technologies such as sensors and sensor interrogation technologies derived from the emerging “IoT” industry, management of data and information fused together in an open architecture framework.
To date, a number of NATO nations have carried out a proof of principle study of components that are needed to manage munitions from design, procurement, service life and decommissioning. All studies have been based around a particular stage though the life of the munition. AVT-212 presented methodologies allowing nations to integrate and implement areas of expertise in weapon systems across the whole life of the weapons system using technology from previous AVT activities (AVT 119, 160, 176) and new approaches.
The proposed CDT will demonstrate:
• the application of sensors and IoT technology to missiles
• the resulting benefits of this new development in terms of operational capability, interoperability and life-cycle costs savings
To this end, the CDT will use the following tools:
One inert air-to-air missile equipped with embedded sensors and an internal HUMS, interrogated using IoT technology in real time.
Another inert missile, tube launched, with a HUMS in the launch tube (TBC)
A movie to explain how pooling and performance-based acquisition would work as a capability multiplier for NATO countries.
The CDT will be delivered to NATO nations representatives, in cooperation with AC 326 and AC 327.
The CDT group will provide support to CASG subgroup B on the preparation of an Allied Publication on this topic beyond the duration of ST-004, if needed by the partner nations involved in the corresponding Smart Defence Initiative.
The following topics will be covered during the preparation of the CDT by one missile system company, one rocket motor manufacturer, one sensors company, representatives from end user organization responsible for central munition surveillance or from AC 326 – CASG,
Safety Requirements (e.g. AC 326 – CASG, missile system company)
Platform Technology (missile system company)
Missile System and Rocket Motors Technology (missile system company, rocket motor manufacturer)
Sensing Technology (sensors company)
Networking / Communication (sensor company)
Modelling/Data Handling (rocket motor manufacturer)
Life Assessment Methodologies (rocket motor manufacturer, missile system company)
Life Cycle Cost of Missile Systems (AC 327 – Life Cycle Cost Group)
Differences between Guaranteed Service Life and Actual (end user organization)
In Service Surveillance and Life Extension of missiles (AC 326 - CASG, missile system company)
The Task Group will organise dedicated preparatory meetings and develop the hardware and media required for the demonstration.
The demonstrations will be held in Brussels, Belgium. Synergies with the current NATO D:I: Smart Defence Project, supported by AVT-ST-204 will be exploited.
|AVT-292||Applied Vehicle Technology|
|AVT-293||NATO UNCLASSIFIED||Active||RTG||2018||2020||Effect of Environmental Regulation on Energetic Systems and the Management of Critical Munitions Materials and Capability ||1|
Critical Materials, Demilitarisation, Environmental, Explosives, Green Munitions, Munitions, Propellants, Pyrotechnics, Regulation
The armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries possess and use large quantities of munitions. The production, use and disposal of these munitions makes a contribution to the overall environmental impact. Handling of munitions with energetic materials requires great care and considerable cost. The environmental impact of the processes must be acceptable to an increasingly critical general population to avoid anti-military backlash or overpass any environmental law. Clean up and restoring areas where military activities has polluted the ground or water requires significant funding. Past practices such as dumping at sea or into land-fill sites are no longer generally acceptable. There is a need to know and minimise the environmental impact from munitions so we can handle and manage our land properly. This has been examined in previous RTG/RSM/RLS activities (115, 177, 179, 197, 243)
Regulations are being introduced and intensified for the management and use of materials hazardous to the environment. These regulations will affect the availability of energetic components for munitions and require that data are generated to manage use and disposal. It will also affect the choice of new materials for future application. Critical examination of the impact of these regulations is essential to ensure that NATO has the equipment to meet future needs and will develop the technological base for future munitions in all NATO and NATO related countries.
The study will examine present and planned regulations to assess their impact on energetic systems. Active research options and programmes will be reviewed to determine if they provide options for compliance. It will also identify critical materials and attempt to define routes for providing equivalent capability.
The topics to be covered are:
Review regulations and future developments (REACH etc) across NATO and partners
Discuss impact and R&D developments with active bodies (industry, academia, institutes and regulatory bodies)
Identify short term critical materials for immediate action and critically examine the action being taken.
Assess existing research activities for options for compliance with planned regulation
Assess the applicability of modelling and simulation to predict effects and assess options.
Critical examination of data to satisfy regulations
Propose research activities to cover gaps
|AVT-293||Applied Vehicle Technology|
|AVT-298||NATO UNCLASSIFIED||Active||RTG||2018||2020||Reynolds Number Scaling Effects on Swept Wing Flows ||1|
Aerodynamics, Leading edge, Reynolds, Scale, Separation, Trailing edge, Transition, Wing
Future combat air vehicle requirements are likely to result in wing shapes which will have challenging stability and control characteristics. Examples include demonstrator programmes such as X-45C and X-47B in the US and nEUROn and Taranis in Europe. Experience in these programmes, and in previous in research activities (including AVT-161, 201, 183), has shown that the aerodynamics of wings in this class is challenging to predict using numerical tools and that low Reynolds number wind tunnel testing does not produce results that are adequately representative of full scale vehicles. Without further research to understand these problems, the result will be that conservative estimates must be used for aircraft sizing, resulting in larger and more costly vehicle designs.
There are similar issues for future civil and military blended or hybrid wing-body (BWB/HWB) configurations, which widens the appeal of this activity and hence improves access to resources and expertise.
A complimentary topic for this activity is Reynolds number effects on intake and propulsion integration aerodynamics for unconventional future configurations.
• To improve understanding of the full scale aerodynamics of this class of wing and how this differs from what is measured at low Reynolds numbers or predicted with CFD
• Understand implications for propulsion integration
• To minimise the safety margin that has to be allowed in combat aircraft design to account for uncertainty in maximum usable lift determined from sub-scale wind tunnel test and/or CFD prediction
• To identify improved ways of applying CFD methods to the prediction of these flows and, where appropriate, to recommend improvements to the methods themselves.
• To identify ways in which traditional approaches to transition fixing could be improved for sub-scale wind tunnel testing of this class of wing
• To propose ways of improving the effectiveness of wing design methods
Addressing this should improve our ability to design cost effective future air vehicles in the future and reduce risk in their development.
• Draw together existing expertise and knowledge in this field, including AVT-183 and AVT-201 participants
• Define and agree one or more representative test cases
• Perform high and low Reynolds number wind tunnel testing on a suitable wing configuration
• Share variable Reynolds number intake dataset
• CFD investigations including studies into turbulence models and transition prediction
• Understand and interpret the results
• Understanding flow physics
• Boundary layer development and its influence
• Leading-edge and trailing-edge flow breakdown mechanisms
• Separated and vortex dominated flows
• Intake boundary layer ingestion
• CFD modelling
• Boundary layer and transition modelling
• Turbulence modelling
• Design of relevant experimental test cases and identification of appropriate test facilities
• Wind tunnel test technique
• Cryogenic testing
• Transition fixing approaches
|AVT-298||Applied Vehicle Technology|
|AVT-301||NATO UNCLASSIFIED||Active||RTG||2018||2020||Flowfield prediction for manoeuvring underwater vehicles ||1|
CFD, performance, Submarine manoeuvring
CFD methods have long been used to investigate and understand the steady-state fluid dynamics of partly and fully submerged bodies, i.e. surface ships and underwater vehicles, as a part of the design process or as a means of generating input data for various performance models. In recent years, however, both compute resources and unsteady methods have advanced to a level where unsteady problems are tractable propositions for many researchers. Three recent NATO-AVT RTGs have looked at this class of problem: the sea facet of AVT-161 computed the MOERI KVLCC2 tanker and the DTMB 5415M cases, amongst others, in order to assess the predictive capability of computational methods to predict manoeuvrability and course-keeping performance; the follow-on AVT-216 RTG extended the complexity of the manoeuvres being simulated, including aspects such as active control surfaces and irregular waves; AVT-183 shifted the focus from prediction of the overall manoeuvring characteristics to the quality of the computed flow-field itself. Whilst all three activities have been of great value and generated a huge amount of valuable data and understanding, the breadth and complexity of the test cases hitherto computed has, conversely, left many questions unanswered. Subsequently, a generic submarine geometry and a limited set of manoeuvring test cases were identified in NATO AVT-ET-155 to allow a much narrower focus. With this test case, more thorough understanding of the fluid dynamics processes and the relative capabilities of the computational methods can be achieved, with deeper and more effective interchange between the participating researchers.
Importantly, unlike all previous AVT fluid dynamics work in the sea domain, using a submarine geometry will enable free-surface modelling to be avoided. Aspects that will be considered include, amongst others: the use of higher fidelity CFD methods for the prediction of the flow around the submarine at straight flight, at a steady drift angle and at steady rotation. Validation of the predictions for straight flight and steady drift will be based on flow field measurements and forces and moments. For the steady rotation case, force and moment data acquired from rotating-arm tests will be available.
Within recent AVT work, e.g. that performed within AVT-183, it was found that some computational procedures performed better than other used. Since different codes, grid setups, grid densities and turbulence models were used, it is hard to identify the best approach to accurately predict the flow around ships. The proposed RTG will address this matter more thoroughly by exchanging grids and conducting in-depth comparisons between solutions. Some of the benefits of the outcome of the RTG would include:
• Reduced development risks through advances in reliable prediction of flow and loads on naval vessels;
• Reduced development costs through improved computational methods and techniques;
• Improved tools and techniques to address anomalous flow features.
The new RTG will assess the ability the maturity and applicability of state-of-the-art viscous-flow solvers to predict submarine hydrodynamics of interest to NATO. Specifically, the following activities will be undertaken:
• Predict the flow and loads on a submarine under straight ahead conditions;
• Predict the flow and loads on a submarine at static drift;
• Predict the flow and loads on a submarine in steady turning motion;
• Make recommendations on the selection of grid densities, turbulence models and other numerical settings for predictions of submarine hydrodynamics.
Solutions produced by the various participants will be compared and grids will be exchanged to better understand any numerical uncertainties in the results and/or limitations of methods and approaches used.
• The use of high fidelity CFD methods for the prediction of the flow around a submarine at straight flight, at a steady drift angle and at steady rotation;
• Validation and assessment of computational predictions through comparison with experimentally-derived flow field measurements and force and moment data.
|AVT-301||Applied Vehicle Technology|
|AVT-299||NATO UNCLASSIFIED||Active||RTG||2018||2020||Assessment of Anti-Icing and De-Icing Technologies for Air and Sea Vehicles ||1|
Anti-Icing, Arctic Operations, Cold Region Operations, De-Icing, Ice Accretion, Ice Detection, Icepbobic Surfaces, Ice-Releasing Surfaces, Super-hydrophobic Surfaces
Aircraft in operation, whether in flight or prior to take-off, are subject to the effects of icing whenever temperatures are near or below zero. When icing occurs, the vehicle performance suffers leading to control difficulties and in extreme cases, complete loss of aircraft. Similarly, when ships operate in cold regions such as Arctic and Antarctic areas, ice accretion could result in disastrous situations such as capsizing. Ice buildup may hinder the operation of many systems critical to national infrastructure, including military and commercial airplanes and ships, power lines, windmills, and telecommunications equipment.
In recent years, NATO has rapidly increased its use of UAVs in theaters of battle around the world. Also, UAVs are increasingly being used by NATO nations as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) tools. UAVs leverage military manpower; however icing still presents a major hazard to their operation in cold and/or humid environments. Approaches relevant to mitigating icing risks for large fixed-wing aircraft are not always applicable to UAVs owing to payload, size and power constraints. Further, slow-flying UAVs that operate at low altitudes are more efficient “collectors” of ice as they tend to be exposed to icing conditions for longer durations, thereby increasing the risk of unsuccessful/aborted missions, loss of vehicles and loss of crucial tactical capabilities and information. The growing use of rotorcraft in military operations also presents challenges as certification for flight into known icing is more complex than the established processes used for fixed-wing aircraft.
In the coming decades, the Arctic Ocean will be increasingly accessible and more broadly used by Arctic and non-Arctic nations seeking the regions’ abundant resources and trade routes. There are increasing interests in Arctic operations by both military and commercial sectors, including marine offshore industry.
Appropriate and effective ice protection systems (IPS) are critical for military air (manned and unmanned) and sea vehicles to remain at the first degree of readiness and operate safely and efficiently in icing conditions. Passive (hydrophobic, super-hydrophobic and icephobic surfaces) and active (thermal, electro-thermal, mechanical and chemical) icing risk mitigation approaches have been developed and used to reduce the risk of icing for both civilian and military airplanes and ships as well as for other systems such as power lines, wind turbines, and offshore oil platforms. Electro-thermal systems using nanomaterials and super-hydrophobic and icephobic surfaces have a promising potential for applications to military air and sea vehicles. However, an assessment of these emerging de-icing and anti-icing technologies, along with the existing ice protection technologies, is required to establish their performance and suitability for manned aircraft, UAVs and ships. Ice detection, ice adhesion testing, computational modelling and simulation and experimental testing facilities (icing wind tunnels) are necessary tools for effective evaluation and assessment of ice protection systems.
The main objective of this Research Task Group (RTG) is to evaluate existing and emerging passive and active anti-icing and de-icing technologies for application to military aircraft (manned and UAVs) and ships operating in cold and humid environments. In order to achieve the objective, the following specific tasks will be performed:
• Evaluation of existing and emerging ice detection systems/technologies
• Evaluation of existing and emerging testing methods for ice adhesion strength
• Recommendation of standardized testing method(s) for ice-adhesion strength
• Evaluation of the effect of repeated icing events and coating aging (weathering) on ice accumulation and adhesion
• Evaluation of the effect of different icing conditions on IPS performance
• Evaluation of computational modeling and simulation methods for IPC performance, including ice accretion, ice cracking, ice break-up and ice shedding
• Survey, evaluation and establishment of a database of existing icing testing facilities for IPS technology demonstration
• Development of a strategy for demonstration of selected promising anti-icing/de-icing concepts for application to air and sea platforms
Five topics will be covered by the Technical Team:
• Active and passive ice protection systems - Anti-icing and de-icing technologies
• Ice detection systems/technologies
• Measurement of ice adhesion strength – Testing and analysis methods and standards
• Computational modelling and simulation – Ice accretion, ice cracking, ice breakup and ice shedding
• Experimental icing testing facilities – Survey and database
|AVT-299||Applied Vehicle Technology|
|SCI-298||Other||Active||RTG||2017||2020||Identification and Neutralization Methods and Technologies for C-IED |
Countermeasures, Identification, Improvised Explosive Devices, Neutralization
Countering threat of Improvised Explosive Devices is a high priority issue for NATO forces in order to minimize casualties and maintain freedom of movement, since improvised explosive devices and other explosive hazards are and will be deployed by terrorists and insurgents in NATO areas of operation. The IED threat is expected to remain a major threat in all future NATO missions. Many initiatives were carried out by NATO, individual nations, and other defence organisations to develop and embed methods and techniques to counter this threat.
One of these initiatives was the establishment of the NATO STO Task Group SCI-233 ‘Route Clearance Concepts’ in 2010. This TG focussed on the selection of the most optimal detection sensor technology combinations for route clearance, based on an assessment of all conceivable detection technologies. The SCI-233 results can be used as the starting point for the development of mounted stand-off detection capability in route clearance. (The SCI-286 ‘Technology roadmaps towards stand-off detection in future road clearance’ will contribute to this development.) It is noted that for the other elements in route clearance, such as identification and neutralization, an assessment of technologies and methods is missing.
The objectives of this RTG are to create inventory of all technologies and methods commonly used for the identification (ID) and neutralization of IEDs. The RTG will assess the suitability and current and future performance of these technologies and methods for representative threats in relevant scenarios.
- Inventory of technologies and methods for the identification and neutralization of emplaced explosive hazards;
- Definition of a representative set of threat items;
- Description of the relevant scenarios for the identification and neutralization of explosive hazards;
- Assessment of the identification and neutralization techniques and methods for the defined threats and scenarios.
|SCI-298||Systems Concepts and Integration|
|SET-251||Other||Active||RTG||2017||2020||Ship Radar Signature Management Benefit to Ships ||1|
Radar, Signatures, Models, Signature management, Measurement, Propagation, Dynamic environment, Validation, Kill chain
The signature of a ship and the propagation conditions are crucial factors in determining the outcome of various stages in the kill chain. Ships need to be able to predict the range at which they will be detected by threat radars, the probable success of their soft-kill and also the range at which they are likely to detect threats, particularly asymmetric ones. Ship’s tactics are generally developed on the basis of its signature in a standard configuration; the effect of different ship states needs to be understood and, if necessary, allowed for in those tactics. The validity of models to predict the propagation conditions and the minimum input data required need to be assessed. NATO SET-203 has worked closely with SCI-258 and SCI-293 to pull through the radar signatures work into the AWWCG, including the NEMO 2016 trial. The group will concentrate on radar signatures but will take compatibility with the other signatures into account; liaising with SET-211 on infra-red. It will increase the understanding of radar propagation through the atmosphere close to the sea at cm and mm wavelengths.
The main objective is to quantify the benefit of radar signature management to a ship’s survivability. This requires an understanding of how radar signature management affects the outcome of various stages in the kill chain. To achieve this it is necessary to be able to predict, with sufficient accuracy, the signature of the ship and any countermeasures as seen by the particular threat in the environmental conditions of that scenario.
The group’s objectives will be achieved through liaison with Ships’ Commands, Operational Staff, other NATO groups and national researchers. The topics to be covered include investigations into (i) the sensitivity of the predicted propagation to the data available onboard ship, (ii) the level of detail required on the operational ship’s signature, as well as details of any countermeasures, (iii) the effect of different threat characteristics on the ship’s susceptibility. The propagation studies will be exploited to assess the range at which the ship is likely to be detected by the threat and also the range at which a small threat target is likely to be detected by the ship, hence improving the ship’s situational awareness. The proposed group will use the data gathered in NATO and national trials to validate modelling. A workshop will be organized on the effect of radar signature management on the kill chain; other groups will be invited to participate.
|SET-251||Sensors & Electronics Technology|
|HFM-285||PUBLIC RELEASE||Planning||RTG||2018||2021||Speech Understanding of English language in Native and non-Native speakers/listeners in NATO with and without Hearing Deficits ||1|
Blast Injury, Communication Reliability, Communication Skills, Hearing Aids, Hearing Impairment, Hearing Loss, Military Fitness, Occupational Health, Rehabilitation, Reintegration
Acoustic communication (Speech and hearing) is one of the most important abilities for soldiers to perform their tasks. Misunderstandings can cause fatal accidents or lead to errors in decision making. Within NATO coalitions, communications take place between native and non-native English-Speakers and English-Listeners. Communicating in a non-native language between speakers and listeners with even the best of language skills can be difficult, and variations in the levels of language training, environmental noise, operational acuity, and adjunct communication gear can make reasonable speaker/listeners non-functional at communicating. The NATO setup imposes inherent communications risks which need to be analyzed to develop rules for a reliable multilingual Auditory Communication between participating nations.
Most communication in the military takes place using the transfer of acoustic information (Speaking- Listening): Radio-transmission is used in virtually all communication chains, and almost always by speaking and listening mode. The quicker information is needed, the more likely it will be conveyed through acoustic transmission. Visual or tactile communication requires line of site, or close proximity and involves averting focus or weapon contact to pass along non-verbal communication. Written communication is time consuming and requires special equipment (printers; monitors) that is not always available.
Englilsh is the default language for NATO communication. Most NATO soldiers have other-than-English native tongues, and extent of language training in the English language (written, reading, listening abilities) is highly heterogeneous depending on many factors (School English education; exposure to English; general educational level; and many more). Military vocabulary and Tactical operational language and communication modes are not often taught in school systems. Even among native English speaking soldiers communications is endangered by dialects, pronunciation, slang, education etc.
It is self-evident that communication miscues can pose serious life threatening risks to Military personnel, Military weapon systems, and may lead to errors in decision making decreasing unity of effort and overall operational performance. In a typical NATO situation a French soldier communicates with a German or Polish soldier in English. From the linguistic point of view this adds a degree of difficulty that threatens communication efficacy. The pronunciation of English words by French soldiers, for example, is less clear than from native English speakers, and the auditory differentiation ability of French-spoken English phonemes by a German or Polish soldier is reduced in comparison to their ability to understand a native English speaker. Therefore the reliability of communication is at greater risk.
Hearing loss due to combat injuries is a common sequelae of military training and military operations, to a greater extent than even post traumatic stress disorders (in many countries were data are available). It is an increasingly common health problem in any population. Hearing loss will further degrade communication quality. The CSO 229 recommended a concept for a NATO-wide Database, to assess hearing function. One of the aims of the database, was to provide adequate data to assess hearing function and performance. The CSO 229 group proposed this TAP as the next step to reduce communication risks for soldiers.
The RTG will define standards for acoustic communication based on a soldier’s linguistic and hearing abilities. NATO must therefore analyze this risk area to identify, mitigate, and optimize potential threats to communication that will resolve NATO army abilities to exchange information without errors.
To address this problem, operational military specific speech tests need to be developed for cross-examination across all participating NATO nations. Such operational speech tests delivered in typical military noise environments are superior to standard speech tests performed in quiet or white noise settings in their ability to identify specific risk areas of communication failure.
The tests need an audiogram to identify the normal hearing population and to classify the hearing impaired soldiers. The triple figure test in both native and English languages is almost independent from English language knowledge and can show auditory English differentiation abilities among the various countries.
The validated standard speech tests in quite surroundings (Native language vs English) enables determination of the auditory differentiation abilities for coalition members with a higher level of English language knowledge/training.
The validated standard speech tests in noisy surroundings (Native language vs English) enables determination of advanced auditory differentiation abilities in settings closer to the real life situations in the field that may correlate better with operational performance.
Such operational testing attempts to predict real-world military function and provides the most specific data on communication risk by non-native speakers/listeners. It will also demonstrate the risk and increase in hearing effort required when English-speaking soldiers communicate with non-native English speakers at various education levels, and will recommend training and guidance to enhance soldiers’ communication readiness and function.
The RTG will cover the following topics in the delivered report:
- Recommendations for assessing communication quality in international settings
o Development of international comparable, multilingual speech tests for all soldiers
o Development of tests for communication quality in NATO context
o Development of military specific back ground noise standards in speech tests
o Development of complex multilingual hearing tests using real-life environmental military noise
o Fulfilling routine (network-based) hearing screening
o Defining “soldiers at risk” for communication errors.
o Standards for screening and surveillance for “soldiers at risk”, reflecting non-native speakers/listeners
o Recommendation for Definition and Implementation of National Military Audiology Centers (Hearing centers of Excellence)
o Establishment of a continuous experts conference (2-3 years cycle)
o Recommendation for further Workgroups (RTO):
- 1. Treatment of injuries of the hearing system (current status and future concepts)
Conservative or surgical treatment, incl implants
Auditory and vestibular Rehabilitation programs
- 2. Technical Hearing restoration and protection (“return to duty” requirements), e.g.
Implants (full implants; cochlea implant; middle ear implants)
hearing aids and hearing protective devices
integration in communication appliances
- 3. Further recommendations for Military fitness for duty, e.g.
Medical, occupational and technological challenges
Hearing impaired soldiers
Hearing training concepts
Fit for military equipment and job requirements in non-native speakers
|HFM-285||Human Factors and Medicine|
|HFM-286||PUBLIC RELEASE||Active||RTG||2017||2020||Leader Development for NATO Multinational Military Operations ||1|
Cultural Competency, Leader, Leader Development, Leadership, Leadership Effectiveness, Multinational Military Operations, PerformanceMeasuring Leadership
The 21st century global security environment has led to an increase in the number of NATO multinational military operations. Leaders of coalition military forces are presented with numerous challenges related to differences in operational practices, authorities, military doctrine, command and control organizations and practices, and cultural issues that influence and impact the effectiveness of leaders in multinational military force context. Thus, there is a need to undertake cooperative research to address these challenges and inform leader development for NATO multinational operations. The Exploratory Team (ET) on Leader Development for NATO Multinational Military Operations (HFM-ET-143) confirmed this need as well as the requirement to explore existing gaps in knowledge in this domain, and the opportunity to build upon each nation’s leader development practices for multinational military operations, particularly at the operational level of command.
The primary objective of this research is to assess the effectiveness of leader development and leadership effectiveness in multinational military missions among NATO nations. We will conduct a review of current leader development training as it relates to leadership performance in multinational military missions. Our goal is to increase our awareness of the importance of leader development and to achieve an understanding of the impact of leadership effectiveness on multinational military operations. Given the complexity of multinational military operations, it is necessary to consider strategies for developing leaders who will be prepared to address these challenges. Operationally, today’s military interacts with multinational partners on a greater scale than ever before. Thus, military leaders must be prepared to be culturally adept, and able to deal with differences that arise when working with multinational military forces, as well as working with non-military organizations, international relief agencies, and non-governmental organizations. Future military leaders will be those individuals who are committed to maintaining the military profession of values, ethics, standards, code of conduct, skills, and attributes. Such leaders must also be adaptive and capable of working seamlessly with coalition partners, as well as being operationally effective. To this end, this work group will cooperatively advance leader development by developing a framework and strategy to ensure the development of effective multinational military leaders Key goals of this proposed new effort include establishing closer cooperation between related research efforts using similar education and training methods, and tools for leader development. To this end, the following is the approach that will be taken by the RTG panel during its research.
(1)This RTG will seek to establish the knowledge, skills, attributes, and experience that should be cultivated in military leaders for multinational operations. While each NATO and partner nation prepares its military leaders for multinational military operations, there is no established consensus on the common skills and attributes, or an integrated NATO leader development framework that aligns with the NATO FFAO Strategic Military Perspectives at various levels.
(2)This RTG will:
1. Create a summary of leader development programs in participating NATO and partner nations.
2. Develop an integrated framework for leader development for NATO multinational operations, to be used by NATO and partner nations in their leader development programs and training activities specifically focused on multinational operations. This framework will serve as a reference and resource to understand and evaluate existing leader development programs among NATO and partner nations, and will align with the NATO FFAO Strategic Military Perspectives. Through an iterative process the framework will be developed to include the knowledge, skills, attributes, and experience – and other factors (e.g., ethics, core values, identity and commitment to The Profession of Arms) – proposed to be required for leader development for multinational operations, as well as the associated outcomes.
3. Establish a baseline of current best practices for leader development for NATO multinational operations.
4. Identify gaps that provide linkage between leader development and leader performance and develop guiding principles for addressing them.
We will conduct a review of current leader development practices for multinational operations that occur along the career continuum among NATO and partner nations. This review will cross multiple dimensions including education, experience, training, and personal development in preparation for developing leaders for multinational military missions. We will examine how each nation addresses the core values and ethics, identity and the Profession of Arms in leader development for NATO multi-national operations. What are the similarities? What are the differences? How can we leverage our awareness of these differences to inform the development of effective leaders in multinational context?
|HFM-286||Human Factors and Medicine|
|HFM-287||PUBLIC RELEASE||Active||RTG||2017||2020||Developing a Culture and Gender Inclusive Model of Military Professionalism ||1|
and transition to civilian life, civicmilitary and international relations, cohesion, conduct, culture, diversity, gender, leadership, military identity, military professionalism, recruitment, retention, socialization
Unlike civilian professions, the military profession contains elements that are unique (National Defence, 2003; Sarkesian, 1981), such as the adherence of military duty, loyalty, integrity, courage (National Defence, 2003), and honour (Janowitz, 1960), and encompasses the society, military institution, and the individual soldier (Sarkesian, 1981). Various cultural aspects of the military, such as discipline, ceremonial displays and etiquette, and cohesion and esprit de corps (Burk, 2002; English, 2014), are derived from a military’s professional ethos and the relationship with the associated civil society (English, 2004). Additionally, members of an organization, such as the military, will derive their rules of conduct, impetuses, and norms from the ethos and doctrine formally espoused by that organization (English, 2004). Therefore, frameworks for professionalism play an important role in shaping cultural elements of the profession, but also in guiding the appropriate conduct and behaviour of members of the military.
Interpretations and applications of professionalism have significant impacts on how military culture is shaped, sustained, and changed to adapt to changes in the security environment, whether nationally or internationally; including the expectations of its public supporters to meet operational requirements. Given the intended impact of ethos and doctrine, it is imperative for military leaders to understand how ethos and doctrine shape professional frameworks, which guide the conduct and behaviour of military members. Theories of military professionalism have been proposed (e.g., Abbot, 2014; Huntington, 1958; Janowitz, 1960; Sarkesian, 1981); however, no model has been developed to account for aspects of gender and diversity, such as the underlying socio-cultural aspects of the dominant male-oriented warrior framework (Pinch, 2004), cross-cultural applications, civic-military and international relations, and how leadership and socialization (Bannerjee, Jedwab, Thomas, & Soroka, 2011; Shamir, Zakay, Brainin, & Popper, 2000) play a role in member conduct and shaping military identity. Overall, research has shown that professional frameworks are associated with, influenced by, and impact numerous elements of military culture; however, there has yet to be a model of military professionalism, which accounts for these aspects, as well as gender and diversity implications, and can be used to monitor, measure, and assess this construct.
• To review existing models, frameworks, and measures relating to military professionalism;
• To propose a culture and gender inclusive conceptual model and framework of military professionalism;
• To design and develop measures with robust psychometric properties for further validation; and
• To provide guidance to decision makers (e.g., military leaders) regarding military professionalism and the relationship with conduct, performance, operational effectiveness (e.g., unit cohesion, multi-national task force and inter-agency collaboration).
• Theoretical, conceptual, and methodological research approaches for understanding military professionalism;
• The relationship between military professionalism throughout the military career (from recruitment to transition to civilian life) and at different levels:
o Individual (e.g., military identity, motivation, conduct, values);
o Group/Team (e.g., unit cohesion, leadership, conduct, morale);
o Organizational (e.g., effectiveness, leadership, workforce planning and management, recruitment, selection retention, professional military educational and training); and
o Societal (e.g., civil-military relations, public support, international, inter-agency cooperation and collaboration).
• The cross-cultural context (e.g., historical and current military political, economic, social, technological, environmental, legal - PESTEL) of military professionalism;
• The influence of military socialization of members and the impact on member conduct;
• Ensuring diversity and inclusion in the study and measurement of military professionalism (e.g., gender-based analysis +, gender-based implications); and
• Appropriate methodologies for monitoring, measuring, and assessing military professionalism.
|HFM-287||Human Factors and Medicine|
|SCI-301||Other||Active||RTG||2017||2020||Defeat of Low Slow and Small (LSS) Air Threats ||1|
asymmetric threats, automatic sense and warn, C-LSS, C-UAS, information fusion, networked air defence systems, systems integration
While conventional threats from the air by fighters, bombers, attack helicopters, and cruise missiles remain of concern to NATO, challenges posed by unconventional Low Slow and Small (LSS) air threats are of increasing and vital concern. In particular, the deployment of Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) has provided one of the most significant military capability enhancements of recent years, delivering a wide range of effects in a number of roles. As UAS capability proliferates over the coming years, it would be naïve to assume that these effects could not be targeted against NATO interests.
The Air Defence (AD) challenges posed by UAS are many and range across the complete kill chain; traditional systems may be unable to detect, identify and negate a number of potentially hostile UAS and a range of C-UAS negation effects, up to and including kinetic destruction, may be required. Future challenges will be posed by the problem of discriminating “rogue” UAS amongst the increasing numbers of UAS in both civil and military theatres of operation and by the increasing complexity of the target set.
Whilst programmes such as NIAG SG 170/188/200 have identified extant and near future capability in industry, this “First Generation” capability tends to be expensive and dependent upon highly trained, dedicated, personnel. There is a need to develop cheaper automated sense and warn “ Second Generation” systems linked to a range of proportionate effectors.
The SCI 241 Technology Group (TG) aims to build on the existing NIAG 170/188/200 series of studies and develop a long term NATO approach to C-LSS. It will meet regularly to identify, coordinate and if necessary instigate Analysis, Research and Demonstration work across the NATO nations that clarifies:
a. The future threat posed by Low Slow and Small air systems to NATO interests, singly, networked and/or in swarm
b. The probability of encounter and potential impact of these threats by defined epochs and in mutually agreed operational contexts.
c. Future UAS detect and mitigation options across the complete kill chain
This TG will be a “living programme” that will seek existing far sighted scientific contributions from the NATO military, industrial and academic community to support “Second Generation” C-UAS networked systems that are:
a. Less man-power intensive than current systems;
b. Capable of rapid sense and warn of emerging and future LSS air targets at militarily significant ranges (tbd) with a low false alarm rate;
c. Able to cue and employ a range of effectors;
d. Able to work against targets fitted with countermeasures;
e. Cost effective and easily assimilated into existing force protection infrastructures.
f. Minimise EM and physical interference, fratricide and collateral damage on neighbouring systems.
The programme invites NATO member nations and partners to identify and prosecute work, relevant to future C-UAS systems, within the following scientific and technology areas (not exclusive):
a. The impact of the changing air threat on C-UAS and Air Defence Concepts.
b. Technology challenges posed by future LSS air systems to NATO interests, singly, networked and in swarm
c. Novel sensors/sensor networking
d. Automatic sense and warn algorithm development
e. Command and control C2 systems using emerging technology to maximize situational awareness (SA) of the presence of LSS threats at all force levels
f. Work to automatically detect, track and classify/identify multiple LSS (sub 7kg UAS) targets
g. Novel effectors, including RF and Laser DEW and mission denial options
h. Work to combine a range of similar capabilities (eg C-RAM and C-UAS) into common sensor suites.
i. Ways of signaling the presence of a potentially hostile drone to ground troops.
j. Ways of determining incoming drone intent.
k. Own force drone identification systems.
Interested nations are invited to report such work to the TG, on line and at routine (tbd) progress meetings. The TG will coordinate this work and will jointly identify its relevance to C-UAS solutions. The TG Chair will report its findings regularly to NATO nations via the CSO and the JCG GBAD TOE C-EAT sub-group with recommendations for action where appropriate. This TG will maintain a living programme that is expected to develop as more NATO nations contribute work.
|SCI-301||Systems Concepts and Integration|
|SET-246||NATO UNCLASSIFIED||Active||RTG||2017||2020||Short Wave Infrared Technology: a standardized irradiance measurement and compatibility model to evaluate reflective band systems |
Airglow, Infrared, Irradiance, Models, Night Sky, Nightglow, Shortwave, SWIR Illumination
The state-of-the-art shortwave infrared (SWIR) imaging technology, performance and maturity has emerged to a point where its application in military is now expanding. For instance, SWIR cameras have the potential to replace traditional night vision goggles (NVGs) by providing some key advantages, namely digital format, new detection band for day and night operation. There are numerous other applications where SWIR imaging capability is playing an important role. However, a clear understanding of highly variable SWIR illumination levels and performance assessment is lacking. The night illumination levels for the visible to near infrared are standardized and excellent models to estimate irradiance at different conditions, i.e. full moon, starlight etc. exists. There is no such standard available in SWIR band and there is no standard method by which comparison between SWIR cameras with other systems (ex. NVG) operating in reflective band is available. Therefore, any meaningful sensitivity comparisons between cameras should also incorporate standard illumination data in the SWIR band. Accurate measurement and estimation of SWIR irradiance components and understanding the total illumination in space, time and varied environmental conditions is necessary to evaluate and optimally design a SWIR system specific to mission and applications. The earth’s atmosphere scatters and absorbs incident radiation thus modifies its spectral content, transmission properties, reflectivity and decreases the intensity at the earth surface and scene objects. Additionally, photons from various natural sources as well as from urban lighting interact with the higher earth atmosphere to re-radiate in the form of so called “Nightglow” or “Airglow”. The nightglow phenomenon is particularly interesting in SWIR band. For example, during moonless nights the SWIR irradiance is an order of magnitude higher than the visible band. The nightglow intensity typically peaks in the 1.4 to 1.8 um range well within the SWIR band (0.9-2.8um). SWIR radiation reaching the Earth’s surface is significantly modulated by direct and indirect multiple interactions with clouds and other atmospheric factors that are highly variable in space and time. SWIR band also has several transmission windows that include 0.9-1.3; 1.4-1.8 and 2-2.8 micrometers. Understanding irradiance in these bands will open doors for potential new applications. A focused effort to measure SWIR irradiance, standardization and to develop a model for accurate estimation of total SWIR illumination levels will be essential. Such understanding will be needed to exploit SWIR potential role in meeting and exceeding operational requirements for NATO relevant military systems. Assessment, modeling and data collection efforts would benefit from joint NATO cooperation.
The primary objectives are joint activities to provide common methodology for measuring and modeling SWIR night sky irradiance for imaging sensors and developing techniques on how to apply them to assess and compare reflective band imaging systems. Research areas include field data collection, laboratory data assessment, field performance assessment, performance modeling, and developing a standardized set of tools. Anticipated tools include standard sets of data, models as well as configurations for end-to-end sensor performance characterization and comparison in the laboratory and field. Efforts will be made to exchange data, models and techniques to establish a common basis for research.
The effort will cover modeling, laboratory assessment, and field data collection of SWIR irradiance to understand the data and develop a model similar to visible – near infrared band. The work will cover development of a common framework for SWIR system design, evaluation and a method to compare different systems operating in the reflective band. Collected field and laboratory data will be provided to participating nations for the assessment of developed techniques. Models developed will be made available. A report consisting of recommendations for performance assessment criterion will be provided along with the detailed study results as part of the deliverables. Information may be exchanged with other NATO RTGs such as SET-217 on sensor fusion – SWIR-LWIR
|SET-246||Sensors & Electronics Technology|
|SET-250||Other||Active||RTG||2017||2020||Multi-dimensional Radar Imaging ||1|
Radar Imaging, Multi-static Radar, Multi-channel Radar, Multi-frequency Radar, Polarimetric Radar, SAR, ISAR
SAR/ISAR images have been largely used for monitoring small to large areas and more specifically for target recognition/identification. Nevertheless, limited resolution, self-occlusion effects, geometrical limitations and some difficulties in the image interpretation strongly affect the imaging system effectiveness and, therefore, the performance Automating Target Recognition (ATR) systems. Some of these limitations are due to the use of classical monostatic, single channel system, single frequency and single polarization systems, as they are simpler to build and handle than more complex systems. Nevertheless, solutions have been proposed in the recent NATO SET-196 RTG that show the benefit of using multi-channel/multi-static radar imaging systems when dealing with non-cooperative targets, which can be realized without enormous costs. This NATO SET-196 follow-on activity would like to stem off the results obtained in the previous TG to further develop systems and algorithms by improving what has been previously done and by extending the system dimensionality to include also multi-frequency, multi-polarization and multi-pass radar. The aim is to further increase the performance of radar imaging systems in order to improve the effectiveness of ATR systems. Also, in view of the increasing number of drone-like platforms, multidimensional radar will be assessed and compared against mono-dimensional ones in terms of their ability to provide valid support for classification and recognition of such targets.
The proposed activity addresses the following Long Term Capability Requirements (LCTR): Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Collection Capability as it aims at providing higher quality/resolution 2D and 3D radar images of non-cooperative targets which may significantly increase ATR. The proposed activity also falls within DAT #1 and DAT #2 definitions as high quality radar images may be used to improve Large Aircraft Survivability and Protection of Harbours and Ports. UK6 taxonomy: A09.04 – Image/Pattern Processing Technology.
The broad objective of this team is to investigate the use of multi-dimensional radar to form multi-perspective high-resolution 2D, 3D and tomographic radar images of targets, with the scope of enhancing target classification and recognition. To achieve this objective, the working parties will undertake the following:
1) Define a general framework for multi-dimensional radar imaging,
2) Define signal models and 2D/3D/tomographic image formation techniques for multi-channel/multi-static radar imaging systems,
3) Identify existing multi-dimensional radar imaging systems that may be used to collect data to validate the proposed models and to test the algorithm effectiveness,
4) Compare performance with mono-dimensional radar imaging systems and give indications regarding possible improvement of ATR systems,
5) Analyse the impact on military applications and provide indications for future military use.
The technical topics that will be studied in this RTG are listed (although not necessarily limited to) as follows: 1) Multi-dimensional imaging radar systems, 2) Multi-dimensional radar signal processing, image formation and feature extraction, 3) Multi-dimensional radar imaging system analysis and performance prediction
|SET-250||Sensors & Electronics Technology|
|HFM-283||PUBLIC RELEASE||Active||RTG||2017||2020||Reducing Musculo-Skeletal Injuries ||1|
Injuries, musculo, skeletal
Human Performance is impaired by musculoskeletal injuries (MSI). MSI can affect all military personnel but are a particular hazard for new recruits. MSI include muscle pain resulting in days lost training through to stress fractures resulting in medical down-grading or medical discharge.
The NATO military community recognizes MSI as a significant problem. Since MSI account for over half of all medical discharges, they reduce both training and operational effectiveness and increase the demands placed on associated medical care provision. Published reports show that 20 – 59% of recruits are affected by MSI with about 8% of recruits being discharged due to MSI. Generic interventions have been found to be ineffective.
The frequency and quality of injury reporting varies within and between partner nations.
The objective of this RTG is to focus on primary preventive measures to reduce MSI by:
a) promoting the sharing of information among participating nations
b) identifying the causes and associated risk factors for MSI
c) identifying existing and novel strategies/technologies which may reduce the injury burden
d) linking to other on-going STO-activities
a) Prevalence of MSI during military training (‘green training’ & sport) and the impact of readiness for mission
b) Literature review (including unpublished defence literature) on risk factors (intrinsic and extrinsic) for MSI including GAP analysis
c) Evidence of preventive measures to prevent MSI (including e.g. education, strategies, changing training and equipment)
d) With specific view on several training forms (e.g. Basic Training, training on base, during deployment) and service specific (Army, Air Force, Marines, Navy)
e) Recommendation for common guidance for collection of survey data to capture information to aid identification of the risk factors and incidence of MSI.
|HFM-283||Human Factors and Medicine|
|SCI-297||Other||Active||RTG||2017||2020||Distributed EW Operations in the Modern Congested RF Environment |
5G, Communications, Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA), decision making, Distributed EW, Electronic Warfare (EW), intelligence, Radio Frequency (RF), Situational Awareness (SA), Surveillance
NATO needs improved Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities to dominate the Electromagnetic Environment (EME).
However, research in the commercial communications market is driving the technology forward at a rapid pace. Asymmetric adversaries can easily obtain advanced communications technology by simply buying smartphones. Symmetric adversaries can put this kind of technology in a ruggedised box, or extract key technologies. NATO is in an arms race where EW technology needs to maintain pace with commercial development. This is becoming increasingly difficult due to the introduction of increasingly complex signals (e.g. 4G/5G technology). With communications becoming more widespread and our adversaries making increasing use of Electronic Attack (EA), NATO EW equipment will need to operate in an increasingly congested and contested EME.
If headway in this race is not made, then NATO operations involving EW for situational awareness, intelligence gathering, cueing of electronic attack or Cyber effects will be severely burdened.
NATO needs to find ways to exploit this increasingly congested spectrum in order to acquire and maintain dominance in the EME. The most effective counter to this technical evolution will be the use of networked and distributed NATO EW hardware; single sensors/effectors alone are not up to the task. Distributed EW operations will involve improved cross-cueing, low and high quality sensors, as well as increased data sharing between EW hardware. The result will be high quality EW products enabled through effective signal: detection, classification, geolocation, disruption and denial.
The task group will bring experts from NATO Nations and Partners together to pool knowledge on EW, to:
- Develop concepts to improve interception of complex future communications targets.
- Develop distributed EW technologies to improve future NATO EW systems in an evolving, congested EME.
- Validate & demonstrate techniques through joint field trials.
- Provide an integration path for EW leading to compatibility across NATO.
The focus within the task group will initially be on two use cases:
- MIMO systems (as in 5G); and
- Making sense of a congested EME (e.g. overlapping and interleaved transmissions).
These objectives build on the results from previous NATO and national activities.
The following are starting points for the task group:
- Transceiver technology: determine which EME parameters are required for versatile interception or waveform injection – and how to acquire them. For example, MIMO signals will likely require some antenna diversity; software defined EW (using Software Defined Radio (SDR) technology) will play a role in the versatility.
- Sharing technology: make a change towards more network centric EW operations, in tasking, collecting, fusing as well as reporting. For example, sensors with different quality, some quick, some more in-depth, producing relevant data for all types of communication technologies (e.g. 5G, cognitive radio, increasingly wideband signals).
- Analysis technology: determine the presence of complex communications signals in the congested EME – and intercept signals from opponents. One link with cyber falls under this category (the other involves EA).
- Hardware technology: provide requirements for software defined EW hardware that can be flexible according to tasks and situations, while providing synchronicity for co-operation.
|SCI-297||Systems Concepts and Integration|
|SET-242||Other||Active||RTG||2017||2020||Passive Coherent Locators on Mobile Platforms |
Passive Radar, Motion Compensation, Signal Eeconstruction, Multistatic Processing
Passive radar has specific properties making it attractive for military purposes. These are among others silent operation and anti-stealth capability. Their performance capabilities have been studied extensively and passive radar technology has reached a state of maturity, which makes it a candidate for concrete military applications. At the present moment several operating units of military ground based passive radars have been constructed and many more are in R&D stage.
In addition to ground based stationary installations of passive radar approaches have been undertaken to address passive radar on airborne and maritime platforms.
n continuation of the research on passive radar technology for moving platforms the benefits and challenges of passive radar for military applications on moving ground based, maritime and airborne platforms shall be studied in a new SET-activity. The work will have strong relations with the LTCR’s as follows:
LTCR Priority 10 - Counter Low Signature Airborne Targets; COP, active and passive sensors, target RCS vs bistatic observation angle,
LTCR Priority 12 - Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar: advanced radars
LTCR Priority 13 - Counter Threat to Low Altitude Air Vehicles; sensors to detect threat,
LTCR Priority 25 - Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) Collection Capability: Active and passive sensors
Moreover there is connection between the topics mentioned above and CNAD DAT ITEM 1: Large Aircraft Survivability and DAT ITEM 3: Protection of Helicopters from Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPG)
As far as relations with UK Taxonomy are concerned one can point out on topics as follows:
A09.02 – DSP Technology,
A09.08 - Information and Data Fusion Technology
B06.02 – RF Sensors
B10.09 – Non-Co-operative Target Recognition.
C01.03 - Platform and System Concept Studies
C06.09 - Counter Stealth
R02.L02 - Counter Low Signature Airborne Targets
The focus of this study will be on the specific phenomena related to the changing scenario of environment and interference for moving platforms, the signal processing aspects with respect to platform motion as well as on system aspects and conceptual considerations for maritime and airborne military vehicles.
The study will be a continuation of the work of SET 186 “Airborne Passive Radars and their Applications APRA” and also works undertaken in the frame of the group SET-195 “DMPAR short term solution”
The research will identify basic phenomena including platform motion models as well as signal and clutter models, identify technological challenges including hardware and signal processing development, identify end user requirements and address operational usefulness. The output of this study will be a final report .
- A performance analysis of the moving sensors
- Signal processing and clutter cancelation
- Data fusion, target localization and tracking
- User requirements
- Platform motion compensation
- Reference signal reconstruction
- Direct signal suppression
- Multi-band processing
|SET-242||Sensors & Electronics Technology|
|HFM-278||PUBLIC RELEASE||Active||RTG||2017||2020||Preventing and countering radicalisation to violence ||1|
EXTREMISM, FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS, INFLUENCE, INTEGRATION, INTERVENTION, ONLINE, PREVENTION, RADICALISATION, RECONCILLIATION, RECRUITMENT, REHABILITATION, SOCIAL MEDIA, TERRORISM
In recent years, terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have been notably successful in recruiting young Western citizens, male and female, in order to support their cause; whether by providing funds, IT and other expertise from afar, by traveling abroad to assist with logistics, attack planning and so on, or even to fight in conflicts against the West, local authorities and populations, and occupying territories. The latter are referred to here as ‘Western Foreign Terrorist Fighters’ (WFTFs), and recently, WFTFs have been involved in planning, facilitating, engineering, and/or conducting terrorist attacks across Europe, as well as in Canada, the US and Australia. It is apparent that whilst some WFTF recruits have become disillusioned and come to regret their involvement with these organisations, others present a serious ongoing threat to NATO alliance and Western democracies. As such, a better understanding is needed of what can be done to prevent and counter the appeal of terrorist organisations to potential WFTFs and the risks that these individuals pose to their home countries and to armed forces overseas.
A related and very current issue is that extremist organisations such as ISIL have mastered the use of social media, in an often sophisticated manner, to provoke emotions, grievances, a hatred for the West, and a perceived sense of allegiance with alienated others. Understanding how extremist organisations are using social media and other methods to appeal to and recruit young Westerners, and also as a means to achieve terror goals, can help us to determine how these efforts might be prevented and countered.
The present TAP proposes a Research Task Group (RTG) that comprises representatives from a range of countries interested in responding to the threat of WFTFs, who will collaborate to gather, collate, share and provide a critical review of the available relevant literature. This will be captured in a central database that can be accessed by representatives of those organisations seeking to defeat the very serious risk that WFTFs pose to the security of armed forces and local citizens, in their homeland and overseas. An Advanced Research Workshop is also proposed in order to facilitate the development of the database and critical analysis of literature to be included in this by drawing upon experts in this new and developing field.
It is proposed that an RTG is formed in order to (a) collaborate to identify, collate, share and provide a critical review of existing literature on the topics stated in the Terms of Reference, and (b) hold a NATO Science for Peace Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) in order to access expert opinions of this activity.
• To develop a database that captures the information referred to above.
• To summarise activities, findings and recommendations in a short technical report.
1) How extremist organisations use social media and other methods to appeal to and recruit potential WTFTs, but also as a means to achieve terror goals.
2) Evidence-based approaches that may be effective in preventing and/or countering the recruitment of WFTFs.
3) Approaches that facilitate reconciliation, rehabilitation and reintegration in to society for those who return to their home country from foreign insurgencies.
4) Approaches to improve social resilience to radicalization that include cross-cultural sensitivity training/ awareness to avoid and overcome stigmatization and demonization of specific groups (e.g. for prevention of anti-Muslim attitudes).
|HFM-278||Human Factors and Medicine|
|MSG-152||PUBLIC RELEASE||Active||RTG||2017||2020||NATO Modelling and Simulation Professional Corps Development ||1|
Certification, Education, Modelling, MSG, Professional, Simulation, Training
Since the start of the information age, NATO and Nation modelling and simulation systems have provided support to the alliance for training; education; decision-making; procurement; concept development and experimentation and other areas. In spite of the high degree of reliance on these systems, there has been no formalization of NATO qualifications for the NATO and Nation personnel planning and managing the use of these systems. Defining essential knowledge and establishing professional standards for NATO modelling and simulation improves NATO and Nation performance and provides the greatest benefit to the alliance.
Develop a professional M&S Education and Training portfolio and certification process that more effectively supports NATO and national modelling and simulation requirements. Expand knowledge of modelling and simulation, increase awareness and contribute to the increased standardization of M&S activities across NATO.
• Develop and implement the NATO M&S Professional Certification Process
• Complete M&S E&T Opportunities Catalogue for evaluation of E&T opportunities available in the Nations, with special focus on matching the competencies with the course content developed by ET-40
• Define the NATO M&S Code of Ethics
• Develop and implement the NATO M&S Certification Process and its management
• Identify required competencies for different levels of certification in the NATO M&S E&T Road Map
• Align identified competencies against European Union Educational Framework
• Develop course development timelines and priorities ensuring most critical courses are developed first based on identified NATO M&S competencies.
• To define NATO M&S educational courses and layout general syllabi and its content when feasible.
• Explore the best methodologies for delivering content: online, classroom, lecture series, self-study, hybrid approaches, etc.
|MSG-152||NATO Modelling and Simulation Group|
|SAS-129||PUBLIC RELEASE||Active||RTG||2017||2020||Gamification of Cyber Defence/Resilience |
Cyber Defence, Cyber Resilience, Decision Support, Gamification, Serious Game, Simulation, Training and Education
The 05 September 2014 press release regarding the NATO Summit meeting held in Wales provides a basis of justification for this proposed task group. According to the Summit Declaration, “We are committed to developing further our national cyber defence capabilities, and we will enhance the cyber security of national networks upon which NATO depends for its core tasks, in order to help make the Alliance resilient and fully protected. Close bilateral and multinational cooperation plays a key role in enhancing the cyber defence capabilities of the Alliance. Technological innovations and expertise from the private sector are crucial to enable NATO and Allies to achieve the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy´s objectives.“ In particular, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence current efforts include enhancing information security and cyber defence education awareness and training.
It is essential to understand complex cyber resilience/defense/incident management scenarios. Gamification techniques can be useful in training and education regarding different cyber defense/resilience scenarios in a joint and high pressure environment. Thus, gamification provides opportunities to understand the possibilities inherent in cyber defence and train or educate people while they are having fun, contributing to the goals set forth by the Wales Summit.
To effectively enhance information security and cyber defense education and training through the use of serious gaming and gamification approaches.
The proposed work consists of three main topics.
1) The definition of serious game and gamification, advantages and disadvantages, common problems during development, gamification characteristics, game mechanics and technologies, and defense applications will be examined.
2) Understanding the big picture of cyber defense and resilience, classification of operations and decisions in cyber defense and resilience, and examples of cyber security training and education. This understanding will provide a baseline for the specification and prioritization of cyber security subjects and user groups that can benefit from utilization of gamification and serious game applications.
3) Gamification and serious game methodology guidelines for cyber defense and resilience will be developed. One or more prototype demonstrations implementing this methodology will be developed.
|SAS-129||System Analysis and Studies|
|SAS-130||Other||Active||RTG||2017||2020||Course of Action Analysis in the 21st Century |
Campaign analysis, course of action, operational analysis, scenario, wargaming, weapon systems data
Course of Action (CoA) analysis is a mandated component of NATO operational planning (Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD)) and is also an essential element of the evolving scenario testing methodology used in defence planning to support the identification of NATO Minimum Capability Requirements (MCR). Over the past 15 years, the security environment has been such that the analytic focus in NATO has been primarily on Crisis Response Operations (CROs) for which specific analytical methods (these methods focus on presence, control, counter-insurgency, stabilization and reconstruction rather than conventional force on force engagements) have been developed to support CoA analyses. However, the evolving global security environment has led to a renewed focus within NATO on the analysis of large scale, collective defence scenarios for which campaign analysis models and wargaming were historically applied to CoA analyses. There have been considerable advances in weapon systems accuracy and effectiveness, weapon delivery means, the use of special forces, etc. which are not reflected in current campaign analysis models available to NATO with sufficient fidelity. The combinatory effect of these changes has generally not been reflected in campaign analysis models used by/available to Operational Analysts within NATO to advise commanders in their CoA analyses.
To improve CoA analyses by leveraging the expertise and capabilities within the nations (relating to campaign analysis models and wargaming) to enhance NATO and national defence and operational planning.
Establish the state of campaign analysis models and wargaming within NATO and the nations, identify shortfalls, implement appropriate short term corrective measures and identify additional actions that could potentially be taken to achieve the main objective.
Topics relevant to this activity include:
Inventories of existing campaign analysis software models and underlying data (Collecting this data may have classification issues national and NATO. Admitting data gaps may be sensitive to some organizations. This affects survey design and completeness)
- Definition of the scope of campaign analysis models of interest to this activity: required to support defence and operational planning;
- Development of a questionnaire to capture key characteristics of campaign analysis models – to be filled in by appropriate entities / POCs within NATO and the Nations;
- Design of survey: choice of metrics for model and data assessment
- Sharing of available models and data
+ Coordination with SAS-115 Smart Cooperation in OA Simulation Models feedback from Workshop (expected Q4 2015) on potential means for sharing OA models that may be suitable for sharing campaign analysis models.
Assess the utilization and availability of wargaming approaches for CoA analyses within NATO/nations:
- Identify and survey professional military wargaming skillset education and training programs
- Survey the practices used to identify and select participants in course of action wargames
- Survey defense planning requirements to use wargaming in course of action analysis and planning, as well as senior leader actual use and acceptance of these methods
- Identify and briefly describe professional military wargaming groups and facilities
- Analysis of questionnaire responses.
- Identification of limitations in campaign analysis models and underlying data;
- Connection with NATO/nations defence and operational planning
Proposal for follow-on activity, if deemed appropriate.
- Proof of concept demo/application.
|SAS-130||System Analysis and Studies|
|SAS-133||Other||Active||RTG||2017||2020||Assessment/analysis support to facilitate the introduction of NLW by addressing line of development obstacles |
Acquisition, AntiTerrorismCounterTerroris, Capability Development, Counterinsurgency, Counterpiracy, Deployment, Employment, etc, Exercises, Lessons Learned, Materiel and NonMateriel Solutions, NonLethal Weapons, Operations Peace Support Operations, Requirements, Suitability, Tests, Wargames
NATO and its member nations have seen increasing development and employment of NLW over the past decade, driven by operational experience. NLW have been used in peace support operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, counterpiracy off the coast of Africa, and in counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, where a report for ISAF recommended a “deep dive” to identify non-lethal capabilities and options, as initial data showed enhanced NLW warning effectiveness of 80-90%. This study would build on the history of important and successful work accomplished under the SAS Panel’s auspices, and it would directly address key issues raised by SAS-094.
Facilitate the introduction of NLW by addressing obstacles to development, acquisition, deployment, and employment by NATO and its member nations.
The study will provide analytical and operational experimentation support (including assessment support for wargames, tests, and/or exercises) to address obstacles confronting NLW development, acquisition, deployment, and employment such as employability, suitability (particularly total warfighter burden), and legal/acceptability, with the goal being to identify potential solutions to obstacles. Other topics that could also be integrated include:
- Analysis of countermeasures to NLW (and escalation of force implications)
- Deployment/employment at the tactical level addressing trade-offs, burdens (physical and mental), trust/confidence in the system and its effects, and how to integrate NLW (rheostatic vs. underslung vs. separate) with a fresh look at measures of effectiveness
- Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) developing a methodology for how to adapt existing TTPs, going deep with wargame and field testing (including the development of appropriate analytical and assessment methods) of one or several TTPs, and identifying implications (NATO SOF HQ expressed interest in doctrine writ large as a great way to have enduring impact).
- Highlighting where, how, and to what extent NLW have made a difference
- Developing recommendations for how to compose the NLW toolbox, including cost-benefit and force mix considerations
|SAS-133||System Analysis and Studies|
|AVT-283||NATO UNCLASSIFIED||Active||AG||2017||2019||Advances in Wind Tunnel Boundary Correction and Simulation ||1|
Boundary Interference, Correction, Wall Interference, Wind Tunnel
The discipline of adjusting wind tunnel data for wall boundaries has been in practice almost as long as wind tunnels have been in existence. Demand for more accurate data has continued to push the development of correction methodologies and boundary representation. Additionally, more emphasis has been placed on the validation of computational tools for use in vehicle design and analysis, with the intent to significantly reduce the number of ground tests required to verify a concept. Better correction methods used in ground testing would lead to improved accuracy in the prediction of aerodynamic behavior of future aircraft systems designed for military operations. For example, transport aircraft tend to have large blunt tails that have a tendency to separate easily and advancement in propulsion systems have moved installed systems away from conventional axially directed thrust.
In 1995 The AGARD Fluid Dynamics Panel planned what became AGARDograph 336 which was published in 1998 as a sequel to 1966 publication of AGARDograph 109. Although both of the documents still contain valid information, the requirements placed on the field of wall interference are increasingly stringent in alignment with computational prediction and validation requirements. Correction is still appropriate for certain kinds of production tests, but understanding the interference itself is more appropriate for CFD validation activities. The move to more CFD based design has reduced the demand for testing, and as a result, support of specialists in this area have diminished. It has been 16 years since the last AGARDograph in this area and only one or two of the authors of this document continue to practice in the discipline. The same can be said of the international community that once existed around this topic area.
AG to serve as a companion to AGARDograph 336 to reflect advances, lessons learned and future needs of the aerodynamic ground testing community with respect to boundary interference.
(1) Advanced to classical interference techniques
(2) Advancements in boundary pressure measurements
(3) Transonic interference
(4) Bluff-body interference assessment
(5) Updates to interference in powered testing
(6) Interference for dynamic testing
(7) Adaptive wall interference
(8) Uncertainty in wall interference
(9) Future needs and direction
(10) Use of computational methods in wall boundary interference assessment (results from proposed RWS)
|AVT-283||Applied Vehicle Technology|
|AVT-280||NATO UNCLASSIFIED||Active||RTG||2017||2019||Evaluation of Prediction Methods for Ship Performance in Heavy Weather |
heavy weather, propulsion, Ship performance, stability
Physics-based simulation capability for prediction of maneuvering and stability in waves and wind is of timely importance both for surface combatant and transport ships in normal and extreme operations. Issues for naval ships include operability requirements under all sea states, radical/violent maneuvers, frequent course changes, replenishment at sea, and stealth. Issues for transport ships include IMO Guidelines for EEDI, EEOI and Minimum Propulsion Power requirements. Issues for both include operations in deep and shallow water, intact and damaged stability and energy efficient hull forms.
AVT-216 Evaluation of Predictive Methods for Maneuvering and Control addressed issues for normal operations by benchmarking of prediction capability of ship performance in realistic operational conditions at sea and providing guidance for design analysis, including maneuvering in waves, shallow-water operations, and ship-ship interaction. Building on this progress an AVT follow-on activity is proposed for extension for issues of extreme operations by evaluation of prediction methods for ship performance in heavy weather, including issues of propulsion performance and shallow water.
Outcomes of proposed RTG will enable improved simulation capabilities for prediction of maneuvering for surface combatants in extreme operations thereby providing innovative design opportunities to meet challenges of 21st century naval vehicle operational and standardized regulations requirements. The goal is to provide validated tools to improve capabilities for design and assessment of naval vehicles with increased performance. The proposed RTG is of relevance to 2015 NATO S&T Priorities: Platforms & Materials target of emphasis P&M-1.
The scope of the proposed activity is an assessment of prediction methods for ship performance in heavy weather, including issues of propulsion performance and shallow water. Available and required towing tank and wave basin experiments will be identified for benchmark validation test cases. Experimental conditions will focus on extreme motions/maneuvers, propulsive performance and shallow water. Validation data will include both global (6DOF trajectories, propulsion performance, appendage/rudder/control surface forces and moments) and local (wave elevations and flow field) variables. Simulation codes will cover system based, potential flow and CFD. Simulations will guide the experiments and once validated will fill in sparse data, especially for propulsor-hull interactions. Verification and validation procedures will take into consideration both the comparison error E=D-S (where D and S are the experimental and simulation values, respectively) and validation uncertainty, i.e., root sum square of numerical and experimental uncertainties. Recommendations will be provided as to best practices for current simulation methods as well as directions for future research. Synergy and shared experience will be documented in the final report.
Ship performance, heavy weather, stability, propulsion
|AVT-280||Applied Vehicle Technology|
|AVT-281||Other||Active||RTG||2017||2019||Cross-Domain Platform EO Signature Prediction ||1|
EO, IR signatures, survivability, validation, verification
NATO and partners operate in hostile environments, deploying vehicles in the land, sea and air domains. These vehicles are frequently detected and engaged by electro-optical systems, and in particular systems operating in the infra-red region of the spectrum. A previous group (AVT-232) has conducted a review of the validation status of a subset of military vehicles (namely air platform and missile plume radiation). This group proposes to extend this work to cover ‘full’ platform EO/IR signatures.
To identify codes, processes and algorithms appropriate for the assessment of EO & IR signatures different types of military systems, and to state the relevant validation status.
IR signature generation processes, including thermal, reflection, radiation (solid and gases), propagation and detection
|AVT-281||Applied Vehicle Technology|