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Activity title

Energy Security in the Era of Hybrid Warfare

Activity Reference

SAS-163

Panel

SAS

Security Classification

Other

Status

Awaiting Publication

Activity type

RTG

Start date

2020-07-09T00:00:00Z

End date

2022-12-31T00:00:00Z

Keywords

Cyber defense, Education and Training, Energy security, Geopolitics, Hybrid Warfare, Strategic Awareness, Strategic planning

Background

The term ‘hybrid warfare’ has been used with increasing frequency in recent years to depict an ambiguous, yet pervasive threat to state sovereignty and civil society. This project is dedicated to the deeper understanding of this threat and its broader impact on NATO’s military preparedness, the member states’ infrastructural resilience, and, ultimately, the coherence of the Alliance itself. However, there is no universally agreed upon definition of the hybrid threat environment. For the purposes of this effort, we have decided to use the definition provided by the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threat: “…an action conducted by state or non-state actors, whose goal is to undermine or harm the target by influencing its decision-making at the local, regional, state or institutional level. Such actions are coordinated and synchronized and deliberately target democratic states’ and their institutions’ vulnerabilities. Activities can take place…in the political, economic, military, civil or information domains. They are conducted using a wide range of means and designed to remain below the threshold of detection and attribution.” (https://www.hybridcoe.fi/what-is-hybridcoe/). While the basic parameters of hybrid warfare are firmly grounded in insurgencies or asymmetric warfare, it is the inclusion of modern information communication technologies which makes it so unique and potentially impactful to society at large. Hybrid warfare, which includes cyberwar and targeted disinformation methods, allows states to affect political conditions of their adversaries. Moreover, hybrid warfare is significant because it gives states, terrorist organizations or criminal actors a low cost, high yield method to influence the politics and policies of other states, or even capture territory without the use of conventional military force. The most active perpetrator of hybrid warfare is Russia, which implemented it most effectively in its 2014 annexation of Crimea and continues to use it today to influence its desired political outcomes. As energy is the key to maintaining a technologically advanced civil society and ensuring state viability, the unimpeded flow of affordable energy is critical. While NATO does not have an official definition of energy security, in practice, the Alliance defines energy security as “the assured access to affordable and acceptable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet mission essential requirements”. Indeed, energy security has become a topic of considerable concern within the Alliance, to include the availability and deployment of both fossil fuels and renewable sources. The latter point is particularly relevant; as we experience a transition from fossil fuels to renewable resources, which includes a large injection of stochastic power generation (to include nuclear) in the system that needs to be balanced, requiring storage, smart grids, etc. Therefore, it is important to understand the potential vulnerabilities inherent in this process. A vital component of hybrid warfare is the ability of aggressors to attack and negatively impact the civilian energy infrastructure. Indeed, many hybrid warfare operations have been directed against the energy sector, both the power grid, as well as fuels production and distribution. Ultimately, in a changing and interdependent world, where energy is not only an economic commodity but also a “securitized” strategic resource, affected by national actions and multilateral agreements alike, NATO must adapt and derive ways to meet these new realities, while attempting to strengthen interoperability, interdependencies and mitigate cascading effects. Therefore, a key question must be asked, “What role does NATO play in addressing these dependencies and vulnerabilities?” This proposal outlines an attempt to seriously study this growing nexus, the potential hazards and provide mitigating options.

Objectives

Rapid developments in cyber warfare have driven the evolution of asymmetric (now hybrid) warfare and contribute to its non-attribution or relative anonymity for its perpetrators. As an actor in international security, NATO has a unique role to play in the nexus between energy security and hybrid warfare. This role is particularly vital considering the Alliance’s ability to build a common operating picture for its members. A primary aim of this activity is to address the operational and technological nature of the threat and; 1) raise awareness of the energy-hybrid warfare nexus by understanding its component parts, 2) identify its broader impact in the civilian and military realms, and 3) define courses of action to mitigate the impact on civilian and military infrastructure and interests and develop countermeasures. The research team will delve deeper into the unique energy security dynamics found within NATO. For instance, the role of energy as a component of hybrid warfare will be examined further and will provide the analytic centerpiece to this activity. The continued dependency on fossil fuels (imported mostly from outside of the Alliance borders) leads to a vulnerability on dependent member states. Moreover, the reliance on natural gas as a cleaner substitute for petroleum products introduces new threat variables into the equation. This critical dependence on fossil fuel imports by most of the Alliance’s member states will be explored further. Additionally, as much of NATO’s member states are promoting large-scale electrification of the infrastructure, how this will impact military operations demands further scrutiny. Finally, the ability of an aggressor to attack and disable large segments of the power grid, and thereby impact civilian security, as well as military operations, will be analyzed. Broadly speaking, it was determined that a range of issues will need to be addressed, notably, the social, economic, political and military threats to both the liquid fuel supply chain, as well as the grid. Such a diverse grouping of topics will require a network of subject matter experts from the NATO members and partner or PfP member states. To this end, we have assembled a diverse and highly qualified cadres of subject matter experts. This intellectual foundation will support the analysis throughout the conduct of this activity. Moreover, there will be the need to focus on data acquisition and manipulation, from which to support quantitative analysis, as well as collaborate with private sector experts in cyber defense, to include academia and the member states’ governments, to determine common understandings, as well as define the parameters and countermeasures’ goals. Finally, there will need to be an emphasis on those areas most vulnerable to energy sector attacks among the NATO member states.

Topics

From a scientific perspective, this study encompasses a broad range of topics relevant for both basic and applied research, i.e. within the context of theoretical and conceptual foundations, as well as their application in specific case studies. The concepts of energy security and resilience are well established in the scientific community with a focal point in energy systems analysis and connections to several disciplines including engineering, environmental, computer and social sciences. Several reviews underpin the importance of resilience and energy security for the energy transition, to ensure a safe, secure and sustainable future energy system that provides a stable and affordable supply. In contrast, the topic of hybrid threats is less developed in the peer-reviewed, scientific literature. This is confirmed by a keyword search in Web of Science and Scopus that returned only about 70 publications for the period 2010-2020, with the majority attributable to international relations, computer science and government law. Furthermore, the literature is rather scarce in terms of analytical frameworks. However, this gap presents an opportunity as the proposed activity will significantly advance this area. The joint analysis of energy security and hybrid threats requires a comprehensive approach integrating knowledge and methods from different disciplines. Examples of previously published studies include the joint consideration of (1) resilience and sustainability, (2) energy security and energy transition, (3) resilience and business continuity, (4) energy and military, and (5) resilience and hybrid threats. However, with exception of the second reference, these studies do not provide quantitative approaches and case study applications. A review article by Azzuni and Breyer demonstrates how the different topics could be integrated using energy security as an umbrella concept6. It is also worth mentioning that concepts and approaches developed by international organizations have been analyzed and scrutinized by academia; notably the World Energy Council’s Energy Trilemma or the World Economic Forum’s Energy Transition Index. This is important to establish a thorough knowledge transfer between science, industry, authorities and supranational organizations like NATO or the EU. The current study actually takes a similar approach, and its subordinate projects will address the broad range of relevant aspects within the nexus between energy security and hybrid warfare, including a conceptual framework approach, methodological developments, specific case studies, and stakeholder involvement through tabletop exercises. Additionally, the research team has key competences in complex networks, supply chains, cybersecurity, the maritime sector, policy analysis and complex decision-making, which are essential to address the current research gaps and to advance the current state-of-the-art in this interdisciplinary field. Additionally, it is envisioned that a systems analysis of the energy-hybrid warfare dynamic which identifies NATO vulnerabilities and mitigations will be developed, as well as qualitative system dynamics (e.g. through use of influence / causal loop diagrams), and system context diagrams (e.g. to illustrate the blurred boundaries and blurred ownership of the issue).

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