STONewsArchive: Side-Attack Threat Detection Strategies, Technologies and Techniques
Title:
Side-Attack Threat Detection Strategies, Technologies and Techniques
Start_Publishing:
12/04/2021
Panel_Page:
SET
Page_ID:
3805
Main_Body_Multi:
SET 238: Side-Attack Threat Detection Strategies, Technologies and Techniques
A. Lapointe (DOD-USA), A. Schoolderman (TNO-NLD), S. Irvine (DRDC-CAN), I. Kaufmann (Fraunhofer IOSB-DEU), M. Peichl (DLR-DEU), I. Jupp (DSTL-GBR), D. Letalick (FOI-SWE).
Motivation
Explosively formed penetrators (EFP) as improvised explosive devices (IED) are placed by adversarial forces in order to attack heavily armored vehicles. EFPs attack from the side of a road and are simple to construct, emplace, and conceal. The availability of online construction techniques and lethality make them a significant threat in asymmetric conflicts. The slug’s kinetic energy penetrates an armored vehicle, destroys the equipment, and kills its occupants.
Figure 1: Explosively formed penetrator and transformation of the liner into a metal slug after detonation.
SET 238’s objective was to identify and collect evaluation results to detect side-attack EFPs using cameras, radar, and acoustic detection equipment. Furthermore, SET 238 established standards across nations for evaluation of detection technology that included EFP definitions, surrogate EFP designs, and concealment methods.
Results
SET 238 standardized EFP surrogate designs and distributed mechanical drawings to the nations for use in evaluating detection technologies. Four of six participating nations collected data with a common procedure for concealed EFPs and analyzed this data to identify EFP signatures. The sensors included cameras capable of using polarization ratios to increase likelihood of detection when compared to intensity alone. Radar was used to penetrate camouflage that obscures visible imaging systems. The radar data was processed using synthetic aperture reconstruction, which creates images of road-side scenes that better accentuate targets relative to clutter. Acoustic energy scattered from the EFPs were also processed using synthetic aperture techniques to identify targets.
Figure 2: 3D radar reconstruction of a roadside scene, the faces of cube represent projections of the scene and illustrate clutter objects.
Conclusion
The nations now have a surrogate target set and experimental procedures for comparing test results across diverse systems. Results from testing indicate that no individual sensor sufficiently detected EFPs in all scenarios, but combined responses provides more features for detection. Furthermore, it was determined that multiple observation perspectives on unmanned ground and air platforms should improve detectability and reduce clutter. Information learned from SET 238 is being used to guide tactical technology investments moving forward.
Page_Intro:
SET 238’s objective was to identify and collect evaluation results to detect side-attack EFPs using cameras, radar, and acoustic detection equipment. Furthermore, SET 238 established standards across nations for evaluation of detection technology that included EFP definitions, surrogate EFP designs, and concealment methods.
HomePageImage:
2021-SET-238.jpg
HomePageBodyText:
SET 238: Side-Attack Threat Detection Strategies, Technologies and Techniques
A. Lapointe (DOD-USA), A. Schoolderman (TNO-NLD), S. Irvine (DRDC-CAN), I. Kaufmann (Fraunhofer IOSB-DEU), M. Peichl (DLR-DEU), I. Jupp (DSTL-GBR), D. Letalick (FOI-SWE).
Motivation
Explosively formed penetrators (EFP) as improvised explosive devices (IED) are placed by adversarial forces in order to attack heavily armored vehicles. EFPs attack from the side of a road and are simple to construct, emplace, and conceal. The availability of online construction techniques and lethality make them a significant threat in asymmetric conflicts. The slug’s kinetic energy penetrates an armored vehicle, destroys the equipment, and kills its occupants.
Figure 1: Explosively formed penetrator and transformation of the liner into a metal slug after detonation.
SET 238’s objective was to identify and collect evaluation results to detect side-attack EFPs using cameras, radar, and acoustic detection equipment. Furthermore, SET 238 established standards across nations for evaluation of detection technology that included EFP definitions, surrogate EFP designs, and concealment methods.
Results
SET 238 standardized EFP surrogate designs and distributed mechanical drawings to the nations for use in evaluating detection technologies. Four of six participating nations collected data with a common procedure for concealed EFPs and analyzed this data to identify EFP signatures. The sensors included cameras capable of using polarization ratios to increase likelihood of detection when compared to intensity alone. Radar was used to penetrate camouflage that obscures visible imaging systems. The radar data was processed using synthetic aperture reconstruction, which creates images of road-side scenes that better accentuate targets relative to clutter. Acoustic energy scattered from the EFPs were also processed using synthetic aperture techniques to identify targets.
Figure 2: 3D radar reconstruction of a roadside scene, the faces of cube represent projections of the scene and illustrate clutter objects.
Conclusion
The nations now have a surrogate target set and experimental procedures for comparing test results across diverse systems. Results from testing indicate that no individual sensor sufficiently detected EFPs in all scenarios, but combined responses provides more features for detection. Furthermore, it was determined that multiple observation perspectives on unmanned ground and air platforms should improve detectability and reduce clutter. Information learned from SET 238 is being used to guide tactical technology investments moving forward.
Created at 13/04/2021 09:53 by ad.rodes
Last modified at 13/04/2021 13:52 by ad.rodes
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