

Marginalized gains: The British Regular Army and the British Army Reserve since 2003

Vincent Connelly

Oxford Brookes University
Oxford, OX3 0BP
UNITED KINGDOM

vconnelly@brookes.ac.uk

ABSTRACT

Like many across NATO, the UK Armed Forces aspires to move towards a “Whole Force” or “Total Force” model with an integrated mix of full and part-time military and civilian personnel. A succession of UK Defence Reviews have emphasized that there is a greater need for the part-time British Army Reserve to be more integrated with the full-time Regular Army component. Events in Eastern Europe have shown that mass is still an important facet of fighting power and there have been calls that the British Army Reserve should provide more mass and collective capability in a crisis, reminiscent of its role in the Cold War.

The British Army has had a full-time regular and a volunteer part-time Army Reserve component for over three hundred years and there have been many attempts to more closely integrate the two. However, there have always been tensions between the two components, with quite open hostility at times. A recent example of this was the political infighting over the Army2020 institutional reforms. Similar institutional conflict has been reported in the United States, Canada, Australia and other nations.

It is important to understand how the culture and identity of the various components of Armed Forces impact on adaptation to change, so that integration between components can be improved. It is argued that organizations with workplace interaction rituals, such as the British Army, characterized by ritual density, uniformity of attention, structural homogeneity, emotional intensity, and with highly frequent order giving, are more prone to marginalize part-time personnel. Only those conforming to the full-time norms and ritual characteristics of the organization will be fully accepted. There will also be a drive to assimilate individuals into the full-time culture of the profession and a move to marginalize sub-cultures formed by perceived groups of outsiders.

Using this explanatory framework and drawing on interviews with regulars and reservists, quantitative surveys and other research, this paper will examine the recent use of British Army Reservists and the likelihood of more successful integration in the near future. The paper will examine the barriers and opportunities for military culture change across the lived experiences of these different military sub-groups and the organizational outcomes arising from the tendency to marginalize part-time personnel.

Since 2003, British Army part-time reservists have been increasingly relied upon to supplement smaller scale operations, routine exercises, and full-time workforce gaps. This has led to an “individualised” and “marketized” voluntary contribution of individual reservists [or small groups] assimilated into regular units when required. It is argued that this model of reserve utility has proved stable and psychologically suits both regulars and reserves. Despite recent calls for the Army Reserve to develop more collective capability roles to sustain the army for mass, it is concluded there is a high chance that the British Army Reserve will be continue to be used to provide individual reinforcements or small groups, unlike some other NATO nations.

1.0 THE BRITISH ARMY RESERVES

The British Army has had a full time regular and a volunteer part time reservist element for over three hundred years and there have been many attempts to more closely integrate the two. However, there have always been tensions between the UK regular element and the reservist element with quite open hostility at times. Similar tensions are also reported in many Armies around the world with full time and part time soldiers. This workshop paper attempts to provide an explanation for this tension concentrating on the British Army and relies on extracts from two book chapters [1,2] and data from journal article [3] by the author.

1.1 Reductions in Regular Army personnel

Since the end of the Cold War most Western armies have become very much smaller and the British Army is no different. The British Army, like many of their allies, are going through a long period of structural change in reaction to increased demands on defence activity alongside severe pressures on defence spending. This has led to policy shifts explicitly in favour of diversifying the military labour force to reduce full time personnel costs and the difficulty retaining full time military personnel [4]. The “post-fordist” army thus relies on a small core of full-time regular soldiers with a part time reservist force to provide support when required [5]. The cuts to the full-time numbers of regulars have often been justified by a reference to the greater professionalisation of the full-time cadre remaining [6]. A succession of recent UK Defence Reviews and the 2021 Integrated Review [7] have emphasised that there is a greater need for part time reserve forces to be more integrated with the full-time regular forces in order retain access to mass reinforcement and certain civilian skills needed to reinforce the army in a large-scale crisis. However, British Army part time reservists no longer only mobilise in times of large-scale conflict but are increasingly relied upon to supplement smaller scale operations, routine exercises and full time workforce gaps [8; 9]. Thus, while the overall size of many part time reserve components has shrunk, in line with the reduced size of their full-time components, the necessity to have more effective, integrated and fully staffed reserve forces has increased [10].

1.2 The traditional structure of the British Army Reserves

In theory the British army reserves consists of two main components. The part time Army Reserve and the Ex-Regular Reserve. See Figure 1 below.




Figure 1-1: The British Army Reserves

The Army Reserve is organised into part time battalion sized units and the Ex-Regular Reserve provides a pool of individuals to be recalled to full time service in a crisis. During the 20th century and up to 2003 this was a dual use system where the Army reserve provided additional collective capability with battalion sized units mobilised full time to reinforce follow on forces while the Ex-Regular Reserve provided individual “backfill” to under recruited regular and army reserve units. This system was proved in both world wars and was the design used for reinforcement of British Army formations committed to defending NATO in West Germany in the Cold War. See Figure 2.




Figure 1-2: The 20th Century British Army Reserves in large scale conflict

The Army Reserve remains a regionally based organization with about 350 local training centers [drill halls] spread across the United Kingdom, consisting of up to 30,000 part time Reservists, split among 70+ battalion sized units [9]. The Army Reserve is very similar to the Canadian Army Reserves and the US National Guard model in that volunteers need have no prior military experience and serve part time at weekends and weekday evening in units distributed across the country while holding down civilian jobs. However, there are many individuals with full time regular army experience in the Army Reserve and numbers of these have increased substantially over the past ten years. Educational, medical and fitness standards are uniform across both Regular and Reserve new entrants. The vast majority of part time Army Reservists work in a civilian based full-time job, or study full time, while also being a part time Army Reservist. Those Reservists whose civilian role is similar to their military role are a small minority [11]. Army Reserve units span almost all the major types of army unit and speciality that also serve in the regular army.

Training is provided for the part time Reservists in their units typically once a week in the evening and up to two weekends a month, with an annual continuous training period of up to two weeks a year. Once trained, individuals are asked to voluntarily attend unit training for a minimum of 27 days a year. While many individuals attend a lot more [12] the legal force to mandate Reservists to attend any specific events is not utilized. Army reservists can leave at any time unless they have been compulsory mobilised for full time service. Army Reservists can be compulsorily mobilized for full time service and accept this obligation.

1.3 The changing use of the British Army Reserves since 2003

In 2003, the British Army provided a large force for the invasion of Iraq [UK code name of Operation Telic]. The required the short notice compulsory mobilization of 5,200 reservists from the Army Reserve and the Ex-Regular Reserve. The Army Reserve were asked to provide a few battalion sized units but mainly individual backfill to regular units. The ex-Regular also provided individual backfill to units. However, the Army Reserve generated individuals at a ratio of 1.25 called to 1 in the field while the Ex-Regular Reserve generated individuals at a ratio of 5 called to 1 in the field. Post 2003, the Army Reserve became the “Reserve of Choice” to reinforce the regular army in their deployments and operations but as individual reinforcement or in small groups, never larger than company sized. Also, from the end of 2003, the Army policy has been to ask individuals to “volunteer” for compulsory mobilization through “intelligent selection” [9]. This means the ratio of those asked to “volunteer” for compulsory full-time service to those actually mobilized is considerably larger [often at least 3 to 1] than the non-voluntary compulsory mobilization ratio last used en-masse in January 2003. The continued use of volunteering for compulsory mobilization does ensure there are very few employer or personal appeals against mobilization but makes planning very difficult for the regular staff. It also leads to some reservists not telling their employer or family they have volunteered as the compulsory mobilization papers that arrive give the impression that they are not volunteering [3].

Therefore, the current system has changed from that used by the British Army throughout most of the 20th Century to that in Figure 1.3 below for the 21st Century expeditionary operations.




Figure 1-3: Post-2003 British Army Reserves for expeditionary operations

1.4 Historical tensions between the Regular Army and Army Reserves

Tensions between the regular and reserve components of the British Army pre-date the move towards a Total Defence Force concept in many armed forces [9]. The British Army has been notable for having a smaller Army Reserve component than many other NATO nations and it has also been the case that the leadership of the army have proposed significant cuts on a number of occasions to the Army Reserve in order to maintain

more of the regular component. Sometimes these proposals for Army Reserve cuts have been successful but at other times they have resulted in internal conflict or political decisions to reverse cuts being imposed on the army. At the peak of the Cold War, a large-scale study examined the utility, effectiveness and integration of the Army Reserve at a time when the Army Reserve was almost three times the size it is today. Walker [13], hypothesized, rather negatively, that Regular Army culture was a serious barrier to Reserve forces integration. Walker proposed that individuals in the Regular Army will always be culturally predisposed to marginalise the Reserves and that most of this may arise from self-identity and culturally held beliefs and not necessarily from empirical comparison.

Between 2008 and 2011 the British Army was looking to reform and modernise the UK Armed Forces for the post Iraq and Afghanistan conflict era. The British Army since 1990, like many other Western armies, has moved gradually towards adopting “post-Fordist” principles to deliver greater efficiency in their operational outputs, assist them in moving towards more “Whole Force” structures and also reduce overall costs [5]. Key to this approach was the implementation of the four tenets of Post-Fordism: [1] the replacement of mass labour with a highly skilled core [full time personnel that are more professional and a higher proportion of elite special forces] with a less-skilled periphery [contractors and part time reserve forces]; [2] the outsourcing of non-core functions to reduce overheads [contractors, defence civilian employees and part time reserve forces with specialist civilian skills]; [3] the centralization of headquarters and the flattening of hierarchies; and [4] the development of a network approach to supply, knowledge and organizational structure [e.g. the dispersal and coordination of forces centred on independent brigades]. However, the British Army was under urgent pressure to radically reduce their overall long-term costs in 2008 [14] and so the full time leadership of the British Army initially made the controversial choice to keep as much investment as possible in the full time forces and cut back severely on the reserve forces instead [15].

This disregard for the reserve component by the regular force senior leadership’s culminated in a bitter intra-service rivalry that saw the British Prime Minister eventually intervene and set up an independent commission to examine the UK reserve forces at a deliberate distance from the regular army [15]. This led to a separate Government review on the UK reserve forces that concluded that the greatest challenge to the integration of the reserves was the internal culture of the regulars, in particular within the Army, and this was the key strategic risk to the Future Reserves 2020 £1.8 billion programme [16, 3]. The intra-service rivalry continued despite the political intervention whereby the British regular army leadership recovered from being very much outmanoeuvred by a reservist supporting political lobby and successfully toned down the increased role that part time army reserves were given in Future Reserves 2020 [15]. A continued negative culture towards reservists was also highlighted in the annual set of follow up external scrutiny team reports [17] and the need for closer regular reserve integration is tellingly again emphasised in the UK 2021 defence response to the Integrated Review [7]. Defence reviews in other countries have led to similar intra service rivalry between regulars and reserves [18,19] and demonstrates that tensions between regulars and reserves is not just an issue for the UK Armed Forces and is a wider challenge to a Total Defence Force concept that is enduring in nature. For example, a review in Australia concluded that the relationship between regulars and reserves was historically characterised by “paternalism, jealousy and obstructiveness” [20, p.21] and that it was “a law of nature that regular forces will tend to be dismissive of reserve forces or at least downplay their value” [21, p.11]. What can explain such rivalry?

2.0 EXPLAINING THE MARGINALISATION OF ARMY RESERVES

Many full-time professions, with their institutionalized power dynamics and boundaries to entry, tend to marginalize their part time professionals [22]. The armed forces in the light of being total institutions, often with a strong vocational ethos, make this risk of marginalization more likely for those not obviously conforming to the full-time norms of the military profession [3]. The social elite status of many armed forces personnel and the transmigrant status of reservists can offer some opportunity for crossing boundaries

between civilian and military worlds - if gains in status can be elicited - more often than not though this works against the reservist. In fact, the strong vocational identity of the full-time armed forces personnel can view the reservist as someone not to be trusted and, in extremis, as not needed [13]. This poor view of reservists is sometimes reinforced in societal discourse, especially if full time and part time components of the armed forces are in competition for resources as recently seen in the UK [3, 15].

Organisations, like the Armed Forces with workplace interaction rituals characterized by ritual density, uniformity of attention, structural homogeneity, emotional intensity, and with highly frequent order giving are more prone to marginalise part-time workers and those not seen as in the profession [Lawrence & Corwin, 2003]. Only those individuals fully conforming to the full-time norms and ritual characteristics of the organization will be fully accepted. Furthermore, organizations with these ritual characteristics will be more likely to enact a workplace culture that has 1] strong, definite, and enduring workgroup boundaries that marginalize outsiders, where 2] there will be pressures for internal conformity to the values of the profession, 3] where individuals will be judged against the group norms of time, productivity, commitment and 4] where the level of stratification will also be high. In these organizations, the legitimacy of part-time workers will be challenged since part-time employees do not conform to the typical template of the workplace and the profession. There will also be 5] a drive to assimilate individuals into the full time culture of the professions and a move to reject or marginalise sub-cultures formed by groups of outsiders who may be seen as a threat to the status of the profession [23, 24, 25].

2.1 A strong and enduring workplace boundary around the regular army

It is recognized that in line with many other professions that the full-time regular army strongly bounds its membership. Most part time reservists were often seen as civilians first, and thus outside the army, and where the “Army” was shorthand for the regular army. The boundary was strongest around the combat arms [3]. This was also reflected in British Army documents where references to the “Army” were often synonymous with the regular army [3]. Experience within and knowledge of the full-time regular army was a key criterion for permeating the strong boundary around regular army service. Those reservists who had some previous regular service were seen as possible exceptions to this assumption. Special exemptions were also made for those who could offer a civil profession such as a doctor, lawyer, nurse to the army on an occasional full-time basis. However, these exemptions were specifically about where civilian skills could be perceived to assist the military and these reservists were defined against their civilian profession first and not from having a shared military identity. Generally, civilian experience was not seen as relevant for army service by most of the regulars interviewed even though many reservists have leadership, commercial, teamwork, management and sometimes technical and equipment-based experience that could cross domains [3].

2.2 Workplace time and commitment

Commitment to a profession is key to many professional practitioner identities [6]. Professionals use time and perceptions of time served as markers of commitment to a profession and are “expected to be involved in their work at all times, such that ‘ever-availability’ acts as a symbolic expression of professional commitment” [22, p.925]. As with many other professions how the regular army understands “commitment” is complex and multi-faceted but the regular army as a total institution with a strong service ethic is structured so that ‘ever-availability’ is not merely symbolic but a solid part of professional identity amongst its soldiers [3]. It was found that time spent committed to being a soldier and the 24/7 nature of the commitment is a key criterion for being understood as a committed professional. Thus, a barrier to integration between full time and part time professionals is to do with the social construction of time, productivity and commitment. Full time professionals tend to dismiss the professionalism of members who violate the norms of long hours, the blurred boundaries between work and home, and who seem not to be totally committed by choosing to be part time. Those who have a choice to commit, through being part time, will be seen as less committed and subsequently as less professional, regardless of their actual competence.

As research on other civil professionals such as those in healthcare, law, academia and the emergency services such as police and fire recognizes: “The behavioral norms associated with commitment are conflated with the notion of affective commitment – failure to demonstrate the former is evidence of failure of the latter” [25, p.560].

This was all reflected in interviews with regulars who doubted the commitment of reservists to the army and so they could neither be trusted or relied upon [3]. Very few regulars remarked upon the reservist having to juggle a full-time civilian career, a family and a commitment to reserve service [3]. On the other hand, a minority of regulars did profess admiration at an individual level for reservist commitment and commented that they themselves could not maintain such a lifestyle but indicative of the gap in perception they struggled to understand why reservists would put themselves through the burden of reserve service.

2.3 Demands for conformity to the values of the profession

Groups that are perceived to be a threat to a civil profession are often subject to negative stereotypes regarding how they fail to conform to the values of the profession [24]. Among army regular personnel there was a strong shared ideal of the value of selfless commitment and a key way of demonstrating this was to subordinate the individual needs to the needs of the organisation [3]. Reservists were not perceived as reliably subordinating their needs to that of the army. This was reflected in a belief that reservists cannot be relied upon to turn up when required for operations. There was strong reference to the choices that reservists could make regarding training and volunteering for mobilisation for operations, even though the last time there was a high level of compulsory mobilisation almost all reservists reported for duty [26]. Further to this the ability of reservists to “pick and choose” when they went on operations was a source of envy for some [3], as is the case for many full-time employees in organisations that integrate part time employees [22, 24]. Not being there for the mundane or the routine also marks them out different and not conforming may be a marker of unreliability and unprofessional behaviour.

Another key aspect of conforming to the ideals of a profession is accepting the vocational nature of service. Professionals are not solely motivated by material rewards. Some regular personnel thought financial compensation was the perceived motivating factor for many reservists and many regulars reflected a view that reservists were often paid more than regulars on operations, even though they were perceived as less competent [3]. In fact, data from large scale annual surveys in the UK show that both regulars and reserves join and serve for mainly the same vocational reasons [16, 27]. Other sources demonstrated that only a tiny percentage of reservists on operations were paid more than their equivalent regular in order to make up the difference between higher civilian salaries and lower military wages [16]. The perpetuation of myths about a perceived group that threatens the status of a profession has been shown to be a key factor in how professional elites govern entry to a profession and exert control over outgroups [24].

2.4 Rank and professional legitimacy

In the army, hierarchy and rank give both legal and legitimate status to some workers over others but, it has been argued, also now serve to differentiate higher levels of practitioner professionalism [28]. Thus, compliance with superiors is highly valued. However, this compliance is legitimised by the perceived professional competence associated with rank. If the individual holding the rank is perceived as not being competent then the legitimacy to hold the rank will be questioned. If rank is defined by the legitimacy of professional competence and competence is judged by time served then the higher the part time rank the less professional they will be regarded by full timers. Many many regulars perceived a growing competence gap between regular and reserve the higher the rank attained and there was a strong sense that reservists rank was certainly not equivalent in status to the same rank in the regular army. There was sense that some regular personnel felt their status in the Armed Forces was devalued by reservists with the same rank as them.

It will be much harder for part time reservist officers and NCO’s to prove themselves and gain trust from

their regular army colleagues when working together. This is not surprising and is a feature of many professions with part time colleagues [22]. It can be justified given any actual skills gaps between full time and part time personnel. However, very little was made of the value of any civilian experience in management, leadership or technical knowledge that an equivalent ranked reservist may bring with them to their military role unless it was a specific profession such as medicine [3]. This lack of recognition of the crossover of civilian skills, such as commercial management experience, is despite many high-level defence publications positioning reserve forces as crucial for providing this input from the civilian business sector to the benefit of Defence in the UK [7,16, 26].

2.5 Assimilation of individuals

There was strong resistance from regulars reported to formed reservist units or sub-units being operationally deployed [3]. Kirke [29] also noted in a study interviewing British Army regular officers in 2008 about the perceived difficulties integrating mobilised reservists into regular army units that “unless they could trust them well they would indeed dismantle the {Reservist} groups to form individual reinforcements” [29, p.185]. Positively, many regulars can think of a reservist they know who was as professional as them while simultaneously stereotyping groups of reservists as untrustworthy [3]. There is a lack of trust in reservist collective training capability, especially from the combat arms. There was an acceptance of the need for individual reinforcements from reservists but little appetite for formed units. The regular army as an organisational culture can more easily deal with reservist individuals - and even small groups - on operations or training. In this way reservist individuals and small groups are assimilated into the powerful collective culture of the regular army.

Cultural assimilation of individuals, and not integration, probably helped ensure that many individual reservists are perceived to have contributed well on recent operations by their peers in the regular army. Relatively little friction has been reported between regulars and reservists during recent operational tours where individuals and small groups of reservists have deployed. This was unlike the last large scale UK compulsory mobilisation in 2003 where difficulties and negative attitudes to reservists were reported [14]. The UK does seem an outlier in their reluctance to use formed bodies of reservists unlike the US, Australia and even, more recently, Canada, in terms of similar militaries. Those nations that do routinely use collective groups of reservists, such as the US, have though reported cultural difficulties between units of reservists and regulars on operations [30] even though two major US reports [31, 32] concluded that reserve units carried out the operational tasks assigned to them and, with adequate preparation and readiness, performed “without sizeable differences in performance from that of their AC [regular force] counterparts” [31. p.71].

2.6 Implications of marginalisation as individuals

As individual reinforcements, reservists will continue to try to fit in and conform to the dominant full-time culture and mould their own military social identities around the model of the regular soldier. The need for an ephemeral role appears to be a powerful motivator to overcome the considerable pejorative views [34] and actual barriers to reserve service that stem from family and society, and many reservists accept the apparently marginalized role they have in the Army as well as potentially in their own wider lives [3, 34]. Many reservists have enjoyed working within regular units as individual or small group reinforcements and recognise they have made a positive contribution and encourage others to do so. They return back to reserve units more confident and more capable [35]. However, working within regular units often exposes the lack of collective capability in their own current reserve unit training and so can reinforce the perception that reserves can only provide individual capability.

Currently, the “individualised” nature of UK reserve service [36] allows for more successful negotiations regarding mobilization, training and the fulfilment of needs while preserving the ephemeral role [37]. It has been recently argued that this individualisation of reservists who are able to negotiate when they mobilise has been advantageous to the British Army in other ways. It allows for an employer-based flexibility to

contract cheaper reservists to cover workforce gaps that is akin to using self-employed contractors [36] and may also explain partly explain why regular attitudes to contractors mirrors that of attitudes to reservists [38].

On the regular side, the individualized nature of reservists who are given choice over mobilisation and training confirms the view that reservists have to be negotiated with and cannot be fully trusted or relied upon in an emergency [3]. Regular units can quickly absorb and assimilate small groups of reservists so they can be easily controlled, and changes need not be made to the regular ways of working [29]. However, given the continuing regular army gaps in personnel, reservists are certainly considered as useful, provide diversity of thought and experience in units and make a contribution that is welcomed and sustained. This positivity at higher levels reduces the intra-service rivalry and so the system is self-sustaining. The downside is that this justifies cuts to reserve collective capability and numbers, more centralization, poor investment in reserve collective training and reduces the opportunity for reservists to properly exercise command of units [3, 39].

This is not to argue that differences between regulars and reserves are all based on perceptions and do not reflect some reality. There is always a trade-off between risk and cost in the balance between regulars and reserves in any Army. However, many Regular Army personnel believe reservist training simply lacks the time to produce anything comparable to their idea of a professional standard. This leads to a lack of confidence in reservists and a consequent lack of credibility and trust in their abilities, not to mention stereotyping and in some case stigmatization. However, perceptions are also important in how reservists are judged. The reservist represents a challenge to the professional identity of the full time regular, and this in turn impacts on perceptions of the value of the reserve forces. The tendency to marginalize reserve forces is not necessarily drawn from a conscious bias against reservists but is the consequence of the strong military social identity held within an encompassing vocational military culture. This will make it difficult to change. The necessary overarching narrative to permeate the regular force boundary of a large-scale threat that the regular army cannot deal with alone, alongside education to underscore the benefits of a “Whole Force” approach, have not been in place since the Cold War.

3.0 MARGINALISED GAINS AND THE FUTURE

Since 2003, the Army Reserve has become the “Reserve of choice” and an “Operational Reserve”. It now supports the regular army through the mobilisation of individuals or small groups rather than battalion sized units in wartime. It has supplanted the Ex-Regular Reserve in this role and in doing so has contributed to over 40,000 mobilisations since 2003. Aside from the world wars, this is much more than ever before, and it has provided a real contribution to the output of the army from 2003 to 2023. Reforms to Defence legislation have expanded the roles that Army Reservists can support to cover all the roles that regular soldiers can undertake. Army Reservists can now also apply for one of the hundreds of the Full Time Reserve Service [FTRS] positions that are advertised each year and can sign up to fixed term part time commitments to guarantee short term income [Additional Duty Service]. Since 2016, their part time and full-time service contributes towards an occupational pension and other benefits have also improved.

It is argued these gains have been made at the marginalisation of the traditional core role of the Army Reserve of providing unit sized collective capability for reinforcement and acting as the basis of reconstitution and regeneration in a large-scale conflict situation. This has meant the British Army currently lacks a coherent “strategic reserve” that can provide large scale mass and additional “collective capability” in the event of a major conflict or threat to the UK. Since the end of the Cold War this is a gap that could be ignored as the threat of large-scale conflict was relatively low. However, since 2022, this has changed and large-scale conflict in Europe may be more likely. NATO is demanding a “New Force Model” of higher readiness and larger numbers to deal with this increased threat and to deter future conflict in Europe. The UK government wishes to make a substantial contribution to this new force model. However, investment in the British Army remains difficult and regular personnel numbers are currently capped with a downward trend.

The limited size of the regular army and the potential demands of preparing and deterring large scale conflict has seen the more traditional role of the reserve forces for reinforcement, reconstitution and regeneration being revived by some commentators. However, it is argued that Regular Army culture is currently a barrier to developing a coherent “strategic reserve” for mass based on part time Army Reserve collective capability and that similar cultural barriers exist to re-energizing Ex-Regular Reservists [40]. Despite clear evidence reserves are more cost effective [41] and as the threat of mass warfare and the requirement for deterrence grows in Europe, it is more likely than not, that the British Army will use the current context to attempt to justify more regulars and less reserves - unlike many other NATO Armed Forces.

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